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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since Nigeria became independent in 1960, her importance to the 
United States as a supplier of petroleum has rapidly increased and 
the two countries have become increasingly interdependent in terms of 
trade and investment. 1 Yet foreign relations between the two countries 
have shown no corresponding pattern of steady improvement. Indeed, dur-
ing the decade from 1967 to 1976 relations between Nigeria and the 
United States seriously deteriorated. 
In 1967, the United States antagonized the Federal Military Gov-
ernment of Nigeria by denying Nigeria's request to buy arms from United 
States manufacturerswhile antagonizing Biafra by withholding recogrii-
tion.2 Nigeria produced approxi~ately 115.7 million barrels of oil in 
1967 vaTued at $215.6 million. 3 Nigeria ranked sixteenth among world 
producers. 4 At the time of the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, Nigeria 
. l See Scot R. Pearson and Sandra C. Pearson, 11 0i 1 Boom Reshapes 
Nigeria's Future, .. Africa Report, Vol. 16 (February, 1971), pp. 14-17; 
Jean Herskovits, .. Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power, .. Saturday Re-
view: World (February 9, 1974), pp. 14-17; 11 Wooing of Nigeria, .. United 
States News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), pp. 67-70. 
2oye Ogunbadejo, ''Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the 
Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations, .. African Affairs, Vol. 75 
(January, 1976), p. 18. 
3Pearson and Pearson, p. 15. 
4worl d Oi 1, Houston: Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc. 
(August 15, 1968), pp. 187-188. 
1 
had become the second largest supplier of crude oil to the United 
States--a position which Nigeria has retained ever since. 5 Nigeria 
2 
was then, as it was in 1976, the sixth major world petroleum producing 
nation6 and a member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(O.P.E.C.). Nigeria•s total production exceeded 823 million barrels in 
1974. 7 Nevertheless, the Nixon administration aroused unfavorable 
comments in the Nigerian press in October, 1973, by cancelling a sche-
duled meeting between President Nixon and General Gowan, the Head of 
State and Supreme Commander of Nigeria during the latter•s visit to the 
United Nations. 8 Herskovits commented, 11 Fortunately Gowan is not easily 
piqued; otherwise, Nixon might be asking us to lower our thermostats 
even further. 119 
The United States - Nigerian relations reached their nadir in 
1976. President Ford•s letter to African leaders asking them to call 
for withdrawal of Cubans and Russians from Angola drew an angry re-
sponse from the Nigerian head of government, General Murtala Muhammed, 
who accused the United States of 11 armtwisting 11 • 10 Attacks by demon-
strators upon the United States Embassy in Lagos--in January, 1976, 
and again after the assassination of General Muhammed, in February, 
5Herskovits, 11 Nigeria: Africa•s Emerging New Power, .. p. 17. 
6united Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (New York: United 
Nations, July, 1977}, p. 38. 
7united States Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Vol. III (1975), 
p. 683. 
8African Diary, Vol. 13 (October 15-21, 1973), p. 6674. 
9Herskovits, p. 17. 
1011 Nigeria, .. Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana 
Publishing Company, 1976), p. 799. 
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1976--reflected anti-American sentiment in Nigeria, as did the cancel-
lation by the Nigerian government of Secretary of State Kissinger•s 
scheduled visit to Nigeria in April, 1976. 11 These events occurred at 
a time when Nigerian petroleum comprised 14 percent of petroleum im-
ports to the United States, second only to Saudi Arabia. 12 By 1974, 
Nigeria had overtaken and surpassed South Africa as the leading African 
,, 
trading partner of the United States. 13 Nigeria•s crude has economic 
advantage: a sulfur content which is only 0.1 percent, compared ~ith 
0.2 percent and 1.7 percent for Libyan and Saudi Arabian oil, respec-
tively;14 and lower transportation costs than oil from the Arabian 
Peninsula. The availability of Nigerian oil 1973-1974 demonstrated its 
advantages as another source to Middle Eastern sources. Yet only 
during the Carter administration have relations between the countries 
shown any signs of marked improvement. 15 
The objective of this study is to identify major factors in policy-
making which contributed to deteriorating relations between Nigeria 
and the United States during a period of increasing economic interde-
pendence, and to improved relations during the Carter administration. 
A decision-making paradigm will be used to analyze the effects of non-
11 Ibid. 
12sandy Feustel, 11 Leadership in Africa, .. Africa Report (May-June, 
1 9 7 7) ' p . 48 . 
13Bruce Oudes, 11 The United States• Year in Africa, .. Africa Contem-
porary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975), p. 87. 
14Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October, 1973), p. 365. 
15 Feustel, p. 48. 
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economic variables upon United States policy decisions concerning Nige-
ria. The thesis will be advanced that changes in the characteristics 
of the decision-makers, as well as changes in the domestic and inter-
national constraints upon the decision-making process, have facilitated 
a 11 re-definition of the situation 11 in United States• policy toward 
Africa; and that this in turn, has contributed to a policy toward 
Nigeria which is more congruent with economic relations of the two 
countries. 
Rationale for a Decision-Making Approach 
It is submitted that a decision-making approach offers advantages 
in the an~lysis of the erratic course of United States policy toward 
Nigeria. The 11 Realist 11 approaches of Morgenthau and others are useful 
in identifying discrepancies between foreign policy and national inter-
est, but are of little help in explaining why those discrepancies 
exist. 16 Morgenthau diagnoses of such discrepancies in terms of defi-
ciencies in the 11 quality of democracy .. , undue influence of public opin-
ion upon foreign policy and/or excessive legalistic-moralistic attach-
ments are not only vague, impressionistic and difficult to operational-
ize; but also beg the question why such deficiencies exists at any 
given time. 17 President Carter•s foreign policy hardly seems less 
legalistic or moralistic than that of the Ford, Nixon and Johnson ad-
16For expositions of realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), P'. 3-14; Kenneth 
W. Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An 
American Ap~roach to Foreign Pol icz (Princeton: University Press, 
1960), pp. 3-25. . .·. 
17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 12-13. 
ministrations, nor does he appear to be less influenced by public 
opinion than they. Yet United States policy toward Nigeria seems to 
have improved during his administration. 
Determining the 11 national interest .. in pursuing a particular 
policy is a complex task. Charles Binton Marshall observes that 
11 there are many national interests, not just one ... 18 Beard suggests 
that there is no common national interest beyond the special interest 
of competing groups in the national population. 19 The latter view of 
extreme pluralism is difficult to sustain. The structural-functional-
ists have shown that certain basic common tasks must be performed in 
any political system if that system is to survive and perform at a 
level acceptable to its members. 20 Nevertheless, the processes where-
by the goals of systems are identified and the means of attaining 
them are related are performed by human beings. A fundamental assump-
tion of a decision-making approach is that foreign policies are pro-
duced by the interaction of people in decision-making roles who are 
subjected to a variety of pressures, supports, and constraints from 
18charles Binton Marshall, 11 The National Interest and Current 
World Problems, .. United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 26 (May 5, 1952), p. 699. 
19charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York: 
MacMillan, 1934), p. 487. 
20Gabriel Almond and G. B. Powell, Com arative Politics: A 
Developmental Approach (Boston: Little Brown Co., 1966; Marion Levy, 
Jr., 11 Functional Analysis, .. International Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences, Vol. VI (New York: MacMillan Co. and the Free Press, 1968), 
p. 23. 
5 
6 
both domestic and international environments. 21 
Elite-determinist models, including Maxist and neo-Maxist ap-
proaches, assume that official decision-makers were instruments of 
unofficial elites who wield real policy-making power. 22 The experi-
ence of United States-Nigeria relations suggests that the relationship 
between unofficial and official actions is more complex, and that 
.United States policy toward Nigeria appears to have deviated on several 
occasions from the interest of capitalists and other groups which are 
prominent in prevailing theories of 11 the power elite ... Whether or not 
official decision-making is-truly independent of unofficial actions, 
actions of officials are necessary to convert the demands of elites 
into national policies. Therefore, the study of official decision-
making provides a useful focus for tracing the effects of a variety 
of factors upon foreign policy. 
The Paradigm 
Unlike the approach of Snyder, et ~- no attempt will be mad~ in 
this study to take an extensive inventory of the multiplicity of 
21 Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burtin Sapin, 11 Decision-Making 
as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, .. in Snyder, 
Bruck and Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (Free Press, 
1962); James Robinson and Richard Snyder, 11 Decision-Making in Inter-
national Politics, .. in Herman Kelman, ed., International Behavior 
(Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), pp. 435-458; James Robinson and 
R. Roger Majak, 11 The Theory of Decision-Making, .. in James Charlesworth, 
ed., Contemporary Political Analysis {Free Press, 1967), pp. 175-188. 
22Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Re-
view Press, 1969); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1956), pp. 269-297. 
influences upon foreign policy decisions. 23 Consequently, the result-
ing analysis cannot purport to be a complete account of the dynamics 
of United States policy toward Nigeria. It is submitted, however, 
that the paradigm incorporates sufficient variables to be useful in 
illuminating major influences upon policy outputs. 
A political decision is an outcome of a process in which choices 
are made for a polity by officials in that polity. Policy decisions 
refer to decisions which are intended to establish general principles 
to govern relatively broad ranges of conduct. A decision-making sys-
tem is a network of independent governmental roles and processes by 
which official decisions are produced. 
Five features of the decision-making system will receive parti-
cular attention in this study. 
1. Decision-Makers. Who are the key persons who are involved 
in the decision-making system at a given time? How do they compare 
with each other in relative influence upon decision outcomes? How do 
they interact in the decision-making process? 
It is expected that the identity and relative importance of 
various decision-making actors and roles will vary from one adminis-
tration to another, and that a given decision will be influenced by: 
(a) institutional variables, including the interests, traditions, 
structure and legal constraints of the bureaucratic organization to 
23snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 11 Decision-Making as an Approach to 
the Study of International Politics, .. pp. 67-74. 
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which each decision-maker belongs; and (b) idiosyncratic variables, 24 
consisting of the personalities, backgrounds and outlooks of various 
decision makers. 
2. Demands. A demand, as the term is used in this study, refers 
to any group-related interest which ordinarily claims attention from 
decision-makers, including the following: 
a. The articulated demand or perceived interest of organized 
domestic groups, 
·b. Domestic "public opinion," or the perceived views of persons 
not representing organized interest groups, 
c. The special articulated demands or perceived interests of 
overseas actors, especially allied governments and adversary 
governments, 
8 
d. International "public opinion", or the perceived general views 
or reactions of international society. 
3. Functional Requisites. Any state must perform certain func-
tions at some minimum level in order to survive and produce outcomes 
acceptable to the decision-makers constituencies. Three functions 
which Katz identifies are adopted as analytical focii in this study: 
(1) maintenance of domestic cohesion and the political base of support 
for the regime, (2) promotion of a favorable national economic "in-
put-output ratio", and (3) maintenance of security from external 
___;_..-
24The concept is borrowed from James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories 
and Theories of Foreign Policy," R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches 
to Com arative and International Politics (Evanston Northwestern 
University Press, 1966 , p. 43. 
enemies. 25 Although the sanity or public-spiritedness of some nation-
al leaders may occasionally be doubted, it is assumed that most of 
them will strive to achfeve satisfactory levels of performance in each 
of these areas, if only to insure their continued incumbency. Percep-
tions of the functional requirements, their relative importance, and 
the best means of fulfilling them will be by both the idiosyncratic 
and institutional variables associated with decision-making positions. 
4. Capabilities. Capabilities ate resources which can be used 
by one actor to alter the behavior of others in direction(s) desired 
by the former actor. ·The following typology by Etzioni will be used 
in this study: 26 coercive capabilities, consisting of all means of 
inflicting punishment (military force, economic sanctions, breaking 
9 
of diplomatic relations, etc.); utilatarian capabilities, consisting 
of all means of bestowing material rewards (economic assistance, trade, 
investment, etc.); and identitive capabilities, consisting of the more 
intangible means of persuasion (personal rapport and charisma, cultural 
ties, moral qualities, ideological appeals, prestige facility of com-
munication, etc.). 
5. Perceiv~d Compatibility of Nigerian and United States• Poli-
cies. Of critical concern to the quality of relations between the 
United States and Nigeria is the extent to. which policies or charac-
25oaniel Katz, 11 Nationalism and Strategies of International Con-
flict Resolution, .. Herbert C. Kelman, Ed., .International Behavior 
{New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 358-59. 
I 
26Amitai Etzioni Political Unification: A Comparative Studt of 
Leaders and Forces,{New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.,965), 
pp. 37-40. 
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teristics of the two countries are perceived by the decision-makers to 
be compatible. To the extent that those policies or characteristics 
are perceived to be compatible, it is expected that friendly relations 
between the two countries will develop or be enhanced. To the extent 
that the policies or characteristics are perceived to be incompatible, 
it is expected that either unfriendly relations or measures towards 
revision of the policies will occur, depending upon the extent to. which 
decision-makers perceive friendly ties between the two countries to 
be important. 
By applying the foregoing paradigm to the study of United States 
policy toward Nigeria from 1960 to 1978, it is expected that the para-
dox of deteriorating relations during a period of increasing economic 
interdependence can better be understood, and that the prospects for 
continued improv~ment in United States-Nigerian relations during the 
Carter administration can be assessed. Chapters Two through Five 
will correspond to periods marked by changes in relations between the 
two countries: 1960 to 1967, when Nigeria and the United States enjoy-
ed friendly relations; 1967 to 1970, when relations began to deterio-
rate; 1970 to 1976, when the United States sought to adjust to Nigeria•s 
strength as an oil producing country and a significant actor in inter-
national arenas; and 1976 to the present, when the policies of the 
Carter administration generated a new 11 Era of Good Feeling .. between 
the governments. Chapter Six will draw s orne genera 1 cone 1 us ions about 
the relative importance of economic and non-economic factors in the 
foreign policy decision~making on the basis of the findings in preced-
ing chapters. 
A study which focuses primarily upon the decision-making proces!:i 
of one country to explain the pattern of relations between two coun-
tries is admittedly one-sided. A more complete picture would emerge 
by applying the paradigm to Nigeria, as well. Unfortunately, the 
necessary sources of information about Nigeria are more difficult to 
obtain, and the magnitude of such a study would be beyond the scope 
of a Master•s Thesis. It is hoped, however, that systematic study 
11 
of the processes and effects of United States foreign policy deci~ion­
making toward Nigeria by means of the paradigm outlined above will 
add to an understanding of the reasons for an apparent discrepancy 
between national economic interest and foreign policy decisions. 
CHAPTER II 
THE 'ERA OF GOOD FEELING', 1960 TO 1967 
The period from 1960 to 1967 was an era of friendly relations 
between Washington and Lagos, during which "Nigeria became the princi-
pal beneficiary of United States aid"1 in Africa. Among the factors 
which Wallerstein cites to explain why Nigeria received "extra U. S. 
attention" are: greater receptivity on the part of Britain than France 
to "outside" involvement in the affairs of her former colonies; a ten-
dency on the part of American balcks to identify more closely with 
Nigeria than with many other African countries; the availability of 
the English language as a medium of communication among elites of the 
two countries; and the fact that Nigeria, as Africa's most populous 
country, naturally attracted attention. 2 Kaplan adds that United 
States perceptions of Nigeria "as a potential bulwark of Western in-
fluence in a disorganized and unstable continent undoubtedly influenced 
the decision to provide substantial aid." 3 The perception of a Nigeria 
as a "bulwark of Western influence" can be explained by considering 
1George W. Shepherd, Jr:, Nonaligned Black Africa (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1960), p. 113. 
2rmmanuel Wa 11 erstein, "Africa, the United States and the World 
Economy: The Historical Basis of American Policy," FrederickS. Ark-
hurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1975), pp. 22-25. . . 
3Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenge of Foreign Aid (New York: Frede-
rick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 97. 
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the characteristics of the two countries, their leaders, and their 
institutions during the period. 
Decision-Makers: Institutions and Incumbents 
The fact that the 11 era of good feeling 11 spanned the administra-
tions of three presidents--Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson..,-provides 
an opportunity to assess the relative affects of personalities and 
roles upon United States' policy toward Nigeria. Although there were 
significant changes in the organization of decision-making during 
the period in question, changes in the occupants of policy decision-
making roles were more frequent, and their immediate effects upon 
policy were more dramatic. 
Institutional Developments 
13 
Although the Secretary of State is officially "top man in the 
hierarchy af advisers to the President on matters of foreign policy••,4 
his actual influence has varied markedly depending upon his own per~ 
sonality and that of the President. 5 Accordingly the Secretary of 
State will be treated as a behavioral rather than an institutional 
variable. Within and outside the State Department, however, several 
agencies developed strong vested interests in African policy. 
Perhaps the most conspicuous institutional development during the 
period was the emergence of Africa-oriented agencies within the foreign 
4Marian D. Irish and Elke Frank, U. S. Foreign Policy: Context, 
Conduct, Content {New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), 
p. 11. 
5Ibid. 
14 
policy bureaucracy of the United States. Emerson remarks that Africa 
did not come 11 fully into its own 116 until the Bureau of African Affairs 
was created within the State Department during the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration. From its inception in 1958, the Bur~au was the principal 
agency which reflected African viewpoints within the United States 
government. Since the majority of states within its jurisdiction were 
governed by Black Africans, the Bureau tended, even in the Eisenhower 
Administration, to be more critical of colonialism and apartheid in 
Africa than were other agencies of the government. 7 
The Bureau's personnel increased from 44 in 1960 to 97 in 1962.8 
As the newest and smallest of the regional bureaus, the African Affairs 
Bureau was still at a competitive disadvantage in disputes with rival 
agencies, especially the Bureau of European Affairs. Such disputes, 
however, mainly concerned relations with Portugal and South Africa, 
and the pace of decolonization in East Africa. 9 The Africa Bureau 1 s 
supportive position toward Nigeria was compatible with that of the 
European Bureau because that policy did not offend Nigeria's former 
colonial metropole, the United Kingdom. 
6 Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 25. 
7Marcel Van Essen, 11 The United States Department of State and 
Africa, .. Journal of Human Relations, Vol. 8 {Spring-SuiTITier, 1960), pp. 
847-48; Jim Hoagland, South Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1972), p. 360. 
8vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1963), p. 290. 
9Hoagland, p. 360. 
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Nigeria was especially salient to the Bureau, not only because of 
the country's size and population, but because of the special informal 
ties which the Bureau of African Affairs maintained with the United 
States Embassy in Nigeria. Joseph Palmer II, the first United States 
Ambassador to Nigeria, had previously been Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State responsible for African Affairs; and, as such, had helped to 
organize the office which became the Bureau of African Affairs. 10 In 
1966, he succeeded G. Mennen Williams as head of the Bureau. Pa 1 mer 
maintained a close relationship with the Bureau during the interim. 
By mid 1962, the State Department maintained 108 diplomatic and 
consular posts in Nigeria--second only to Ethiopia in numbers of 
foreign service and ICA officers deployed to a sub-Saharan African 
. 11 
country. While the magnitude of the United States reserve was com.;. 
mensuate with the size of Nigeria's population, the sizeable numbers 
of United States diplomatic and consular representatives helped to 
assure that Nigerian needs and concerns were communicated to Washing-
ton. 
During the Kennedy Administration, two new agencies were created 
to implement United States overseas assistance programs: the Peace 
Corps, outside the State Department, and the Agency for International 
Development, a semi-independent agency within the State Department. 
By 1962, Nigeria had the largest number of Peace Corps Workers and AID 
· 
10G. Mennen Williams, Africa for the Africans {Grand Rapids, Mich-
igan: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Co., 1969), p. 164. 
11 Foreign Service List (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, August, 1962), p. 5. i 
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personnel of any African country; 759 and 190, respectively. 12 In 
contrast to the suspicion of the Peace Corps in some countries, Niger-
ian officials reported 11 that the Peace Corps had performed an invalu-
able service for their country and that they hoped a contingent would 
always work in Nigeria. The Agency for International Development (AID) 
was formed by a merger of two organizations which previously adminis-
tered economic assistnace for the United States: the International 
Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the Development Loan Fund (DLF). 
The reorganization not only improved co-ordination of foreign aid pro-
grams, but created bureaucratic vested interests in their continuance 
in Nigeria. 13 
An older agency within the State Department which, after 1960, 
assigned increasing weight to Africa, was the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs (BIOA) .. The BIOA prepare position papers for 
United Nations. In 1960, the Assistant Secretary who headed the BIOA 
observed that African countries would soon comprise the largest single 
block in the U. N., and that 11 there is great opportunity within the 
framework of the United Nations for co-operative efforts between our-
selves and the African states to advance our mutual interests ... 14 
Outside the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency was 
undoubtedly influential in shaping United States' policy toward Nigeria, 
12F. Seth Singleton and John Shingler, Africa in Perspective (New 
York: Hayden Book Company, Inc., 1967), p. 296; McKay, Africa in World 
Politics, p. 366. 
13For the tendency of foreign affairs bureaucracies to perpetuate 
and multiply their functions, see John Kenneth Galbraith, 11A Decade of 
Disasters, .. Progressive, Vol. 35 (February, 1971), pp. 33-38. 
14Quoted in McKay, Africa in. World Politics, p. 343. 
17 
although the agency's role must be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence. The CIA's involvement in deposing the late Premier Lumumba and 
in bringing Colonel Mobutu to power in Zaire has been discussed by 
other writers. 15 According to a former CIA station cheif, the CIA 
decision-makers in the early 1960's believed that Nigeria was 11 next on 
the list 11 of African countries to be targeted for Soviet subversion. 16 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that the CIA encouraged support 
of, or at least did not oppose, United States efforts to sustain the 
moderate, pro-western government of Prime Minister Sir Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa in Nigeria. 
More direct evidence is available concerning the positions of the 
Departments of Commerce. In August, 1959, a Trade Mission of the 
Department of Commerce reported that Nigeria offered 11 an investment 
climate unequalled in any underdeveloped area so far studied ... 17--an as-
sessment which was reiterated in later publications by the department. 18 
15see Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: Morrow, 
1962), pp. 219-229; Stephen R. Weissman, 11 Zaire: Fisticuffs for Mobu-
tu, .. The Nation, Vol. 219 (November 30, 1974), pp. 558-559; Ian Colvin, 
The Rise and Fall of. Moise Tshombe (London: Leslie Frewin, 1968), 
p. 417. 
16Har~y Risitzke, The CIA's Secret Operations (New York: Reader's 
Digest Press, 1977), p. 199. 
17united States Department of Commerce, Africa Special Report 
(Washington, D. C.: Governemnt Printing Office, August, 1964), p. 12. 
18see United States Department of Commerce, Surve of Current 
Business (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962 ; United 
States Department of Commerce, Trade Review, Economic Outlook for 
Twent Countries in Africa (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1962 ; United States Department of Commerce, 11 Basic Data on 
the Economy of Nigeria," Overseas Business Reports (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, April, 1964), p. 16. 
18 
The Department of Defense, though not substantially involved 
directly in formulating policy toward Nigeria during the period, was 
ins'l;rumental in shaping the national security doctrines and priorities 
which affected United States• decisions concerning Nigeria. Although 
the Pentagon had established a Regional Directorate on Africa in 1957, 
the Department•s relations with Nigeria were limited. A United States 
military officer was attached to the U. S. Embassy in Lagos. Yet the 
bulk of U. S. military personnel in sub-Saharan Africa were stationed 
at the military convnunications facility in Ethiopia, and the military 
missions in Liberia and Mali. 19 Nevertheless, a policy of bolstering 
stable, pro-western governments, like the one in Nigeria, during a 
period of intensified Soviet activity in the Congo, Guinea, and else-. 
where in Africa, was consistent with prevailing military concepts of 
containment. 
The first half-decade of Nigeria•s independence coincided with 
the increasing influence of the White House Staff, especially the Presi-
dent•s Assistent for National Security Affairs, upon foreign policy. 
The incumbents in that position during the period in question, mani-
fested little interest in Africa. The National Security Council, which 
President Eisenhower•s NSA Assistant fashioned into an elaborate deci-
sion-making mechanism, 20 was used as a major decision-making organ on 
African affairs at the outset of the Congo crisis in 1960. 
The NSC brought together the President; the Vice President; the 
Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense; the Director of the Office 
19 McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 302. 
20Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David 
McKay Company, Inc., 1969), p. 4. 
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of Defense Mobilization; and any other officials whom the President in-
vit~d to consider policy matters affecting national security. Accord-
ing to a Senate Investigating Committee Report, expressions of concern 
aboutthe Congolese Premier, Lumumba, and a fateful meeting of the NSC 
led to the CIA's attempt to assassinate Lumumba. 21 The demise of Lumum-
ba contributed to the division of Africa into rival blocs, the "moder-
ate11 side being led by Nigeria and supported by the United States. 22 
In other respects, however, the role of the NSC in shaping United 
States' relations with Nigeria was minimal. The NSC atrophied under 
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who relied on smaller ad hoc groupings 
of key advisers. 23 · 
In the early 1960's Congress tended to defer to the executive 
branch of governrr'~ent in matters of foreign policy, especially on matters 
relating to Africa. In general, members of Congress had "only meager 
awareness of events and realities in Africa.•• 24 Within Congress, sus-
tained interest in Africa was largely confined to the subcolllllittees 
on Africa, which were established within the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1959. Occasional-
ly, African policy came under the scrutiny of the Internal Security 
21 Bruce Dudes, "The United States' Year in Africa: Postscript to 
the Nixon Years," Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76 (New York: Af-
ricana Publishing Co., 1976), p. 119. 
22Arnold Rivkin, The African Presence in Worl Affairs (New York: 
The Free Pr~ss of Glencoe, 1963 , p. 15; Claude S. Phillips, Jr., 
The Develo ment of Ni erian Forei n Polic (Evanston, Illinois: North-
western University Press, 1964 , p. 90. 
23Hoopes, pp. 4-5. · 
24stanleY Meisler, "The U. S. Congress and Africa," Africa Report, 
Vol. 9 (August, 1964), p. 6. 
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Committee and the Appropriations Committee, as certain members of those 
bodies perceived political advantages in public opinion concerning 
communist subversion and foreign aid, respectively. 25 The ability of 
Congress to obstruct Presidential initiatives on Africa depended largely 
upon the strength of presidential leadership, vagaries of publi~ opinion 
polls, and the proximity of an issue in time to foster coming elections . 
. In sum, the institutional framework of decision-making provided 
broad constraints upon United States policy toward Nigeria. Neverthe-
less, policy outputs varied considerably, depending upon which indivi-
duals occupied the key positions within those institutions at any 
given time. 
Idiosyncratic Variables 
The record of United States relations with Nigeria supports the 
proposition that "presidential style has considerable impact--possibly 
more than that of the organization charts--on the patterns of interac-
tion among the policy makers." 26 President Eisenhower, whose overseas 
experience had been primarily in Europe, "preferred to delegate" 27 
responsibility in foreign policy matters. President Kennedy, on the 
other hand, considered foreign policy to be his forte, and he was 
determined to be his own Secretary of State. 28 The fact that Kennedy 
25Ibid. 
26 rrish and Frank, p. 11. 
27 Edmund Wright, "Foreign Policy Since Dulles," Political Quarter-
Val. 33 (April, 1962), p. 117. 
28 Irish and Frank, p. 189. 
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had served as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Africa before be-
coming Chief Executive gave him greater expertise on Africa than any 
United States President in history. 11 Kennedy, it could be said, under-
stood the increasingly important role African nations would play in the 
world scene, and Africa, more than any other area, was to assume a 
· t · h · d · · t t' 1129 new 1mpor ance 1n 1s a m1n1s ra 10n. 
Among the African countries, Kennedy gave priority to establishing 
good relations with Nigeria. He envisioned a 11 role for Nigeria in 
Africa similar to that which he hoped India would perform in Asia: a 
powerful democratic state friendly to the United States and the West 
in its region of the world. 1130 It is not surprising, then, that while 
the Eisenhower Administration established relations with Nigeria and 
other emerging natiuns in Africa on a correct and friendly basis, sup- . 
port for Black Africa, in general, and for Nigeria in particular, 
reached unparallel heights during Kennedy's presidency. Between 1960 
and 1963, total United States' economic assistance for Africa more 
than doubled, from $207 million to $427 million. 31 The $225 million in 
United States' grants and loans which were allocated for the Nigerian 
development plan in December, 1961, constituted 11 the largest single com-
29Frank Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, 2nd edition 
(New York: A 1 fred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 605. 
30Ibrahim A. Gambori, 11 Nigeria and the World: A Growing ·Internal 
Stability, Wealth, and External Influence," Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 29 (Fall, 1975), p. 156. 
31 Agency for International Development, U. S. Foreign Assistance 
and Assistance from International Or anizations Jul 1 1945 - June 30, 
1961 revised Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962 , 
p. ix; Agency for International Development, U. S. Overseas Loans and 
Grant$ Ju1 1 1945 - June 30, 1971 (Washington, D. C.: Office of 
Statistics and Reports, May, 1972 . 
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mitment the United States has made to an African state ... 32 
President Lyndon Johnson announced in his January 14, 1965 message 
to Congress that Nigeria was the only African country to be included 
among the seven countries which received 64 percent of United States 
development aid because of their ability to use the aid effectively. 33 
The Johnson Administration•s support of Nigeria, however, cannot be 
attributed to any strong personal knowledge of Nigeria, Africa or 
foreign relations. As Kennedy•s Vice President Johnson had made an· 
official three day visitto Senegal, and he 11 Carried on a fairly steady 
correspondence with Pres·i dent Senghor and other African 1 eaders, u34 
especially those of Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania and Li-
beria.35 Nevertheless, Johnson admitted he was 11 much more familiar .. 
with Latin America than with Africa. 36 
According to one official, Johnson tended .. to view foreign affairs 
as a sort of 1 black art•, its substance alien to him and its Eastern 
establishment practitioners even more so ... 37 The ability of the United 
States to maintain friendly relations with Nigeria during his first two 
32McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 354; 11 U. S. Announces Inten-
tion to Aid Nigeria Development Program, .. United States Department of 
State Bulletin, vol. 46 (January 1, 1962), p. 25. 
33Emerson, Africa and United States Policy, p. 39. 
34Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vanta e Point: Pers ectives of the 
Presidency, 1963-69 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971 , pp. 
351-52. 
35 Ibid., p. 353. 
36 Ibid., p. 352. 
37 I. M. Destler, .Presidents Bureaucrats and Forei n 
Politics of Organizational Reform Princeton, New Jersey: 
University Press, 1972); p. 105. 
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years in office can be attributed to a penchant for preserving contin-
uity with the Kennedy tradition by retaining in his administration key 
38 
members of the Kennedy team. Unlike Kennedy, however, Johnson lacked 
sufficient understanding of international relations to overrule major 
foreign policy and military advisers on important issues. 39 In 1966, 
the resignation of G. Mennen Wi 11 i ams, the most promi nant State Depart-
ment spokesman for Africa among the holdovers from the Kennedy Admin-
istration, left a team of principal foreign policy advisers to most 
of whom Africa was 11 the D;,.rk Continent ... 
The identity of other leading individuals who shaped relations 
with Nigeria varied markedly from one administration to another. The 
years of good relations between Nigeria and the United States coincided 
with a period of relatively weak leadership from the Secretary of 
State--and concomitant aggressive leadership among his subordinates in 
the Bureau of African Affairs. Nigerian independence occurred during 
the post-Dulles years of the Eisenhower Administration. John Foster 
Dulles' successor, Christian Herter 11did not make a particularly strong 
secretary .. 40 and did not perpetuate 11 the one-man determination of 
foreign pol icy that distinguished Dulles. u4l The Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs began to express viewpoints which Dulles 
would probably never have cleared. At a time when such NATO allies as 
38 rrish and Frank, p. 196. 
39Hoopes, p. 8. 
40 John A. Garratay, The American Nation Since 1865 (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1966), p. 381. 
41 Freidel, p. 571. 
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Portugal and Belgium were resisting independence for their African 
territories, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Joseph Satter-
thwaite, boldly announced, concerning the "readiness" of Africa for in-
dependence: 11 1 believe that history has shown that this is an almost 
academic question. Peoples tend to make independence ready or not, 
according to a timetable of their own making. 1142 In his address at 
Tulane University in January, 1959, Satterthwaite acknowledged the 
United States• commitment 11 to contribute to the stability and evolution 
of this giant continent, to be responsive to its needs and sympathetic 
t . t . t. ..43 o 1 s asp1ra 1ons. A career foreign-service officer who had pre-
viously served as Ambassador to Burma, Director of the Neareastern and 
African Affairs Office, and Director General of the Foreign Service, 44 
Satterthwaite was sensitive to the revolutionary currents in emerging 
nations. 
Perhaps the most significant change in the post-Dulles foreign 
pol icy of the Eisenhower Administration was an abandonment of th·e 
· theol ogica 1 rejection of neutra 1 i sm1145 which characterized Secretary 
of State Dulles• mentality. In his historic address to the United 
Nations on September 22, 1960, President Eisen hewer ca 11 ed upon members 
of the United Nations 11 to respect the African peoples• right to choose 
their own way of life and to determine for themselves the course 
42Quoted in McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 343. 
43Quoted in Mark Van Essen, 11 The United States Department of State 
and Africa," Journal of Human Relations, Vol. 8 (Spring-Summer, 1960), 
p. 852. 
44who•s Who in America, Vol. 31 (1960-66), p. 2418. 
45 Shepherd, p. 106. 
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they should choose to follow .... 1146 Governor Nelson Rockefeller, 
Special Ambassador to Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations, told 
Nigerian leaders that the United States did not 11 expect the newly inde-
pendent nations like Nigeria to stand beside the United States as a kind 
of active and committed ally in all struggles and conflicts which are 
dividing the world ... 47 These indications of a significant departure 
from the rigid anti-neutralism of the Dulles era gave Nigerian leaders 
the needed latitude to establish friendly ties with the United States 
without abandoning their policy of official non-alignment. 
The position of the African Bureau was further strengthened by 
the appointments of the Kennedy Administration. Kennedy filled the 
position of Assistant Secretary of State before he appointed the 
Secretary of State. He appointed a strong political ally, G. Mennen 
Williams, to the former position, which Kennedy described as 11 Second 
to none ... 48 Kennedy 11 deliberately selected a relatively weak Secre-
tary of State, Dean Rusk," in order to assure the President's own 
hegemony in foreign policy. Williams, former governor of Michigan 
and Vice Chainnan of the Democratic National Committee, was "mini-
mally knowledgeable about Africa. ~~ 49 Yet he was "a seasoned politi-
cian and administrator who was more than a match for the Assistant 
46 
.. Eisenhower Calls for Peace Through U.N.," The New York Times 
(September 23, 1960), p. 5; Richard P. Stebbins, ed., Documents on 
American Foreign Relations., 1960 (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 1961), p. 554. 
47Quoted in 11 Nigerians to Achieve Their Independence, .. The New 
York Times (October 1, 1960), p. 5. 
48Quoted in Destler, p. 266. 
49 Shepherd, p. 109. 
Secretaries for Europe and other areas in the State Department ... 50 
Under Williams• leadership, the Bureau of African Affairs became more 
militant than ever in promoting Black African causes. When colonial 
officials complained about his controversial call for 11 Africa for the 
Africans 11 President Kennedy replied 11 I don•t know who else it should 
be for ... sl 
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During Kennedy•s first months in office, an unofficial 11 New Africa 11 
group formed in the executive branch. 52 The group consisted of offi-
cials who shared 11 the conviction that in Africa nationalism was the 
wave of the future, and the United States must put itself in clearly 
and unmistakably on the •side of history• . 1153 Leadership from the 
group came from Williams; from his Deputy Assistant Secretary, J. 
Wayne Fredericks, and from the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
national Organization Affairs, Harland Cleveland. Cleveland worked 
closely with Adlai Stevenson, the United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations, who also belonged to the group. As a former Presiden-
tial candidate of the Democratic Party, Stevenson commanded great 
prestige among the liberal wing of the party, and was influential in 
securing United States support for a General Assembly resolution con-
demning the African politice of a NATO ally, Portuga1. 54 Also belonging 
50 McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 350. 
51 Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 
p. 539. 
52Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (New York: Dell Publishing Com-
pany, 1967), p. 246. 
53 Ibid., p. 245. 
54united Nations General Assembly Resolution 1603 (XV), April 20, 
1961, in Emerson, p. 72. 
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to the group were Under Secretary of State George Ball; and Chester 
Bowles, whose credentials included previous service on the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, authorship of a best-selling book on Africa, 
and brief service as Under Secretary of State before becoming a poli-
tical casualty of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The backing of the Presi-
dent and this distinguished group assured sympathetic attention to the 
needs of Black African countries. 
The members of the "New Africa" group continued to serve the John-
son administration for awhile: Stevenson, until his death in July, 
1965; Williams and Ball, until their retirements in 1966; and Freder-
icks, until he returned to the Ford Foundation in 1967. Bowles and 
Cleveland became increasingly peripheral to the group as a result of 
ambassadorial appointments--the former to India in 1963, the latter to 
NATO in 1965. Nevertheless, the persistence of a pro-Africa nucleus 
of. advisers in the early years of the Johnson administration helped to 
sustain a positive orientation toward sub-Saharan Africa on the part 
of the United States government. 
Demands 
Outside the government, concern for Nigeria on the part of Ameri-
cans was limited to a small number of groups and "publics"--principally 
scholars, missionaries, black Americans, and United States• business 
interests. Programs scholarships provided by the Ford, Rockefeller and 
Carnegie Foundations had helped to create a small but significant body 
of scholars with expertise on Africa. By 1962, three organizations of 
American "Africanists" on college faculties were expressing opinions on 
United States policy toward Nigeria: the African American Ins~itute, 
with offices in both Washington and Lagos; the American Society of 
African Culture, which opened a cultural Center in Lagos in 1960; and 
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the American Committee on Africa, which served as a political pressure 
group to promote the interests of Black Africa. 55 
These intellectuals served as 11 0pinion leaders, .. 56 shaping the 
orientations of American elites at a time when the Congo crisis and the 
proliferation of new states on that continent were attracting attention. 
In testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Professor David Apter, a distinguished young scholar 
who had benefitted from Ford Foundation grants, asserted that: 11 It is 
the business of the United States to back unity in Nigeria but never to 
dictate whose unity or what kind ... 57 
Black Americans, preoccu~ied with their own unfulfilled struggle 
to achieve domestic civil rights, were not yet a major force in shaping 
United States• policy toward Nigeria. Metsler writing during the 
Johnson administration remarked: 
so far, the Negro•s ethnic tie with Africa has f iled to have 
much effect on Congressional action or attitudes. Congressmen 
hear far more from American Jews about strengthening Israel, 
from Ukranian-Americans about erecting a statue to their na-
55 McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 254. 
56 . ( E. Katz and P. F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence Glencoe, Ill: 
Free Press, 1955), p. 76; E. Katz, 11 The Two-Step Flow of Communication: 
An Up-to-Date Report on a Hypothesis, .. Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 21 
(1957), pp. 61-78; James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Ra·ndom House, 1961), p. 29. 
57For the full text see David E. Apter, 11Testimony U. S. Con-
gress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcom-
mittee on Africa Hearin s: Briefin on Africa, 86th Congress, 2nd 
Session Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 134-
139. 
tionalist poet Shevchenko, from Polish-Amer~cans about freeing 
the old country from Communist domination.5 
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The American Society of African Culture, the principal group of Ameri-
can blacks with a specific orientation toward Africa, made Nigeria 
the site of its West African Culture Center. Yet its interests were 
cultural rather than political. 
Christian missionaries in tropical Africa, numbering nearly 
10,000 in 1962,59 comprised 11 the largest group of American civilian 
residents in Africa ... 60 Nigeria had attracted over 1,200 of them--the 
largest missionary population of any African country. 61 . In 1956, the 
Africa Committee of the World Council of Churches' Division of Foreign 
Missions issued a policy document which declared: "The West has thrust 
. . 62 itself upon Africa; we cannot remain indifferent to the consequences." 
Probably the most influential private interests to make demands 
concerning policy toward Nigeria were business corporations. Oil was 
discovered in Nigeria in 1957,63 and by 1960, three United States oil 
companies-~Gulf Oil, Overseas Petroleum, and Mobil Exploration--had 
58M . 1 6 · e1s er, p. . 
59 Emerson, pp. 49-50. 
60 . McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 250. 
61 Emerson, p. 49. 
62"Activities of Private United States Organizations in Africa," 
United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Subcommittee on Africa Hearin s, 87th Congress, 1st session 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961}, p. 135. 
63william Hance, African Economic Develo ment, revised edition 
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger; 1967 , p. 259. 
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acquired concessions in the coastal areas bf the Niger Delta. Nigeria 
began to export petroleum in 1962, and oil exports expanded rapidly 
under a petroleum code favorable to foreign investment. The oil lobby 
was the most powerful lobbying force on Capitol Hill, 64 and the "Big 
Seven" companies represented by the American Petroleum Institute, were 
keenly interested in Nigeria. 
As Africa's largest market, with a population officially reported 
at 55.6 million in the 1964 census, Nigeria was generally attractive 
to United States firms engaged in international commerce and investment. 
Until 1960, United States' investment in Africa amounted to only two 
percent of total United States investment abroad, and half of the in-
vestment in Africa was in South Africa. By 1960, however, the percen-
tage of United States' investment in Africa had doubled to 4 percent, 
two-thirds of which was in countries belonging to the Organization of 
African unity. 65 United States private investment in Nigeria grew 
from $24 million in 1960 to $79 million in 1964, of which some $31 
million was in interests other than petroleum. 66 The more interna-
tionally-oriented business concerns communicated their foreign policy 
interests through a powerful pressure group, the Business Council. 67 
64Erwin Knoll, "The Oil Lobby Is Not Depleted," The New York Times 
Magazine (March 8, 1970), pp. 26-27 and 103-9. 
65 Immanuel Wallerstein, 11Afri ca, the United States, and the World 
Economy: The Historical Bases of American Policy," FrederickS. Ark-
hurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 
1975)' p. 20-21. 
66central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review (June, 
1965)' p. 12. 
67Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure: Political Process in Ameri;.. 
can Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 34; David T. 
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Support for close economic ties with Africa was not without its 
opponents, however, especially where foreign aid was concerned. Within 
the ranks of business, spokesmen for the International Basic Economy 
Corporation; W. R. Grace and Company, Sears, Roebuck and Company, and 
the Chase Manhattan Bank expressed concern for the de-stabilizing 
effects of foreign aid to developing countries. 68 Public opinion polls 
indicated declining support for foreign economic assistance programs 
as Asians and Africans replaced Europeans as the major recipients of 
aid. 69 That United States' programs in Nigeria survived in an unfriend-
ly climate of public and congressional opinion is an indication of her 
importance to powerful decision-makers and interest groups. 
During its first two years, Kennedy's "New Frontier" generated 
sufficient momentum to raise United States' economic assistance to 
Africa to its highest level in history. After 1963, however, aid to 
most African countries was curtailed, pursuant to the committee, which 
President Kennedy formed to mollify the critics of foreign aid. 70 
Significantly, however, the clay committee recognized certain exceptions 
in which "the United States must play a major role. "71 Nigeria was 
designated as one of them. By mid-1967, Nigeria had received $160 mil-
Bazelon, "Big Business and the Democrats," Conmentary, Vol. 39 (May, 
1965) ' p. 42. 
68Robert F. Smith, "Whatever Happened to Baby Alianza?" New Poli-
tics, Vol. 4 (Winter, 1965), p. 91 note 3. 
69Alfred 0. Hero, Jr., "Foreign Aid and the American Public," 
Public Policy, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 84. · 
70sorensen, p. 351. 
71 Edward S. Mason, Foreign Aid anq Foreign Policy (New York: Har-
per and Row, 1964), p. 56. 
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lion in bilateral grants and loans from AID which placed Nigeria second 
only to Zaire as the leading sub-saharan recepient of AID bilateral 
economic assistance. 72 The $44.2 million in grants and loans which AID 
committed to Nigeria in fiscal years 1966 and 1967 exceeded bilateral 
aid provided to any other African country, including previously favored 
North African recipients. 73 
The favored place of Nigeria was reaffirmed by the report which 
President Johnson requested from Edward Korry, the United States am-
bassador to Ethiopia. The Korry Report recommended, inter alia, that 
11 the United States should concentrate its bilateral aid programs in 
those African countries whose size, population, resources, and perfor-
mance afford the best opportunity for development ... 74 Consequently, 
Nigeria did not experience the substantial curtailment of United States' 
economic assistance which most African countries encountered after fis-
cal year 1963. 75 . Singleton and Shingle wrote in 1967: 
A recent favorite (as an aid recipient) has been Nigeria, the 
key nation of West Africa. With American help, Nigeria will 
hopefully become an example of development under a government 
that encourages private enterprise76 
72Anthony Astrachan, 11 AID Resl ices the Pie, .. Africa Report, Vol. 12 
(June, 1967), Table, pp. 13-14; U.S. AID, .. United States Economic Aid 
to Africa, 11 Africa Report, Vol. 9, Table, 'p. 10. 
73Astrachan, Table, pp. 13-14. 
74Ibid, p. 10. 
75 AID, U. S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971 
(Washington, D. C.: Office of ~tatistics and Reports, May, 1972}, pp. 
9, 32, 64 and 82. 
76 . 1 . d . 2 S1ng eton an Shingler, pp. 293- 94. 
The fact that Nigeria•s encouragement of private enterprise77 had al-
ready won her influential friends in the United States• business com-
munity helps to explain her success in securing 11American help ... 
Functional Requisites 
33 
In terms of functional requisites, Nigeria was important to the 
United States from the standpoint of national security, as well as 
economic benefits. By the late 195o•s, developments in Africa indicated 
that the continent might become a major theater of the Cold War. When 
France pulled out of Guinea in 1958, 11 hundreds of Soviet block techni-
cians and advisers (including Soviet Intelligence Agents) poured 
into .. 78 that country, which was headed by a self-described Marxist, 
Sekou Toure. In November, 1958, Guinea and Ghana announced a merger 
in a political union 11 as a nucleus of West African States ... 79 Although 
the Ghana-Guinea 11 Union 11 was largely a fiction, it remained officially 
in existence. 
In September, 1960, the arrival of Soviet military trucks, trans-
port planes, and technicians to troubled Congo-Leopoldville,80 at the 
request of that country•s volatile Premier Lumumba, marked a turning 
point in United States• policy toward Africa. The CIA•s complicity in 
77Peter R. Odell, Oil and World Power: Background to the Oil Cri-
sis, 3rd edr (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 90. 
78singleton and Shingler, p. 289. 
79Joint Communique by the Presidents of Ghana and Guinea, quoted 
in Immanual Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967), p. 33. · 
80colin Legum, Congo Disaster (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 
1961) ' p. 141. 
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the overthrow of Luniumba•s government is well-documented. 81 In Septem-
ber, 1960, when Ghana•s President Nkrumah denounced Western actions 
in the Congo, Secretary Herter remarked that Nkrumah had 11marked him-
self as very definitely leaning toward the Soviet bloc ... 82 It was in 
this Cold War context that the United States responded to Nigeria, which 
became independent little more than a week after Nkrumah•s speech. If 
the Eisenhower administration appeared to be more tolerant of non-align-
, 
ment in 1960 than in 1955, United States decision-makers still distin-
guished sharply between officially 11 non-aligned 11 countries like Ghana 
and Guinea, which seemed to tilt toward Moscow, and countries like 
. 83 Nigeria which were more inclined toward the Western orbit. 
According to Hilsman, a speech by Khrushchev on January 6, 1961, 
was given great significance by President Kennedy, who 11 directed that 
all the members of his new administration read the speech and consider 
what it portended ... 84 Khrushchev•s speech, declaring that the Soviet 
Union would support 11Wars of national liberation ... wholeheartedly and 
without reservation. .. as reinforced fears of United States military 
strategists that the Soviet Union would seek to exploit the United 
States• overreliance on nuclear deterrence by supporting guerrilla 
81 rully, pp. 219-29; Weissman, pp. 558-59; Colvin, p. 147; Oudes, 
p. A-119. 
82Quoted in McKay, p. 345. 
83shepherd, p. 106. 
84Hilsman, p. 414. 
85rwo Communist Manifestoes (Washington, D. C.: Washington Center 
of Foreign Policy Research, 1961}, pp. 51-52. 
wars in developing countries. 86 Within a week after the speech was 
delivered, the 11 Casablanca 11 bloc of seven 11 revolutionary 11 states was 
formed which supported the soviet-backed faction in the Congo. 87 
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Nigeria played a leading role in countering this grouping, by 
co-sponsoring (with liberia and Togo) the Monrovia Conference of May, 
1~61. To a significant extent as a result of Minister Balewa•s skill-
ful diplomacy, the Monrovia group, consisting of twenty relatively 
moderate or conservative states, was fornled. 88 This bloc was by far 
the largest, most diversified bloc of African countries in existence 
at the time. The charter of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), 
was formed in 1963, marked the triumph of the Monrovia point of view. 
' 
Rivkin remarks that the OAU Charter is 11 purely and simply, the repu-
diation of the inter-African code of behavior of the Casablanca block 11 
and that 11 The Monrovia bloc .•• had its code of behavior ratified and 
adopted by the thirty-one states in attendance at the Addis Ababa Con-
ference ... 89 For a status guo power like the United States, 90 counter-
86Hoopes, pp. 13-14, Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 61-62; John W. Spanier, 
World Politics in an Age of Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Pare-
ger), pp. 148-49. 
871nunanuel Wallerstein, Africa: The Politics of Unity (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 47048. 
88west Africa (August 26, 1961), p. 930; Africa Report, val. 6 
(June, 1961), p. 5; Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Niger-
ian Foreign Policy (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 
1964, pp. 90-91. 
89Arnold Rivkin, Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1969), pp. 15-16. 
90The term 11 status ~ power 11 refers to the type of state described 
by Morgenthau as one 11whose foreign policy tends toward keeping power 
and not toward changing the districution of power in its favor ... 11 Hans 
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action of revolutionary influences on the African continent was a 
major diplomatic victory in the African theater of the Cold War. 
In January, 1964, almost at the outset of the Johnson Adminis-
tration, fighting erupted again in central Africa. The.National Liber-
ation Committee (CNL) with offices in the People's Republic of the 
Congo and Burundi, sppnsored a guerrilla war against the government 
of Congo-Kinshasa. The support given to the CNL by Communist China, 
both in Brazzaville and in Burundi, 91 was viewed with alarm by United 
States decision-makers, who sought to bolster the regime of the con-
troversial Moise. Tshombe in Kinshasa. 92 The controversial Stanleyville 
airlift in November, 1964, when United States' planes transported Bel-
gian paratroopers to rescue civilian hostages from the CNL rebels was 
widely condemned, even by such "moderate" African states as Ethiopia 
and Kenya, as improper outside intervention. Eighteen African states 
signed a resolution which was introduced in the Security Council of 
the United Nations to condemn theAmerican-Belgian action. Nigeria, 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1963), p. 39. Organski uses a similar (:ategory, 11 the powerful 
and satisfied", the United States, which favors 11the status quo, since 
it has already used its power to establish a world order to its satis-
faction." A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, second, edition (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 369. 
91 Tareq Y. Ismael, "The People's Republic of China and Africa," 
The Journa 1 of Modern African Studies, Vo 1 . 9 (December, 1971 ) , pp. 
516-17; Averell Harriman, 11 United States' Policy and the Congo;" 
(Speech, August 18, 1964) in Catherine Hoskyns, ed., Case Studies in 
African Di lomac No. 1: The Or anization of African Unit and the 
Congo Crisis 1964-65 Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1969 , 
pp. 12-13. 
92 rn June, 1964, American 
government of Congo Kinshasa. 
advisers, motor transport, and 
government. Hoskyns, ed., pp. 
pilots began flying missions for the 
The United States provided military 
C-130 transport planes to the Tshombe 
xii-xiii; Harriman, p. 12. 
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however, demonstrated her friendship with the United States by defend-
ing the action. 93 
Besides providing diplomatic support and stability to a troubled 
continent, Nigeria was a promising economic partner for the United 
States. Nigeria was the world•s leading producer of palm oil, peanuts, 
and columbite, which is used in making alloys for jet engines; and 
was a major producer of rubber, tin, and cocoa. 94 Petroleum production 
grew rapidly, from 0.9 million metric tons in 1960 to 6 million metric 
tons in 1964, and 21 million metric tons in 1966. 95 
It should be noted that Nigeria was not a mjor trading partner, 
nor a major source of strategic minerals for the United States in the 
196o•s. In 1968, Nigeria accounted for only 2.2 percent of total Afri-
can mineral production by value, compared with 26.6 percent for South 
Africa, 28.4 percent for Libya, and 11.3 percent for Zambia. 96 In 
1966, Nigeria provided little more than 0.2 percent of total imports 
of the United States, by value; and purchased only about 0.3 percent 
. 97 
of total United States• exports. Cocoa and rubber accounted for 83 
93Joune Afrique (December 13, 1964), in Hoskyns, ed., p. 45; Emer-
son, p. 2. 
94British Information Service, Ni eria: The Makin of a Nation 
(London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1960 , pp. 8-9; Violaine I. Junod, 
assisted by !drain N. Resnick, ed., The Handbook of Africa (New York: 
New York University Press, 1963), p. 264. 
95Jonathan Baker, 11 0il and African Development, .. Journal of Modern 
African Studies, val. 15 (1977), p. 178 Table .. 
96william A. Hance, Africa•s Minerals: Myths and Realities, .. 
Africa Report, val. 16 (May, 1971), pp. 31-33. 
97 The Statesman•s Yearbook, 1966-67, p. 620. 
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percent of the $35 million worth of commodities which the United States 
imported from Nigeria in 1964. 98 
Nevertheless, the potential for a much greater economic contribu-
tion in the future was evident. United States• private investments in 
Nigeria more than trebled between 1960 and 1964, with petroleum account-
ing for some sixty percent of the total in 1964. 99 In order to encour-
age and protect American private investors in Nigeria, the United 
States signed an Investment Guaranty Agreement, which permitted AID to 
underwrite investment projects undertaken by United States• business 
firms against 11 non-commercial risk of expropriation, currency inconver-
tibility, war and civil disturbances ... 100 The rate of trade expansion 
between the two countries was impressive, and the balance of trade was 
in the United States• favor. United States exports to Nigeria, princi-
pally manufacturers, increased from $17.9 million in 1959 to $64 mi 1-
lion in 1964, compared to $35 million of imports by the United States 
from Nigeria in the latter year. 101 For certain kinds of industrial 
equipment, such as boring machinery, crawler tractors, bulldozers, an-
gledozers, and spare parts for machinery, the United States was Niger-
ia's leading supplier by 1962. 102 In sum, while it is difficult to 
98united States Department of Commerce, 11 Basic Data on the Economy 
of Nigeria, 11 Overseas Business Reports (Apri 1, 1964), p. 16. 
99walter Schwarz, Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 289; 
Unitep States Department of Commerce, Market Indicators for Africa 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 62. 
100united States Department of Cqmmerce, 11 Basic Data," p. 14. 
101 . . The Statesman•t Yearbook, 1962-65, p. 620. 
102 . 
. United States Department of Commerce, 11 Bas i c Data, 11 p. 16. 
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explain the quality of United States-Nigerian relations during 1960-66 
in terms of economics alone, the economic potential of the country and 
the political pressures which it generated among various interest 
groups, no doubt reinforced the importance which Nigeria had acquired 
for United States• decision-makers for reasons of national security. 
Domestic control within the United States was of little or no 
significance as an influence on United States• relations with Nigeria. 
During the 1960 presidential election campaign, Senator John Kennedy 
did accuse the Eisenhower administration of 11 disastrous error and neg-
lect in Africa. 11103 Policy toward Africa cannot be said to have been 
a major issue in the election. By the end of the Kennedy Administra-
tion, neither Black Americans nor white supremacists appeared to con-
sider Africa a particularly salient issue. 104 Foreign aid was a serious 
issue affecting Africa, as support for foreign aid steadily declined, 
not only among members of the general public, but among liberal elite· 
. . 105 
elements, as well. Yet there was still a basic consensus in the 
country on primary goals and objectives of foreign policy, including a 
general acceptance of international involvement on the part of the 
United States. 106 
10311 Kennedy Maps End of •Error• in Africa, 11 The New York Times 
(October 9, 1960), p. 10. 
104M . 1 6 e1s er, p. . 
105H·l 394 . 1 sman, p. . 
106Francis E. Rourke, 11 The Domestic Scene, 11 in Robert E. Osgood, 
et al., America andthe World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1970), pp. 147-48. 
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Capabilities 
The utilitarian capabilities of the United States increased 
markedly during the early 1960's, as three successive administrations 
were able to secure generous appropriations of economic aid for Nigeria 
despite congressional hostility toward foreign aid. During the last 
three years of the Eisenhower Administration, grants and loans to Africa 
under the Mutual Security Act increased more than fivefold, to $169.7 
million, 107 and the United States pledged an additional $1 million to 
an expanded UNESCO. United States' aid to Nigeria doubled to $2 mil-
lion between fiscal 1959 and 1960. 108 The World Bank, in which the 
United States held the largest share of votes, provided a $28 million 
loan for expansion of Nigeria's railway network and took under consi-
deration a loan of $150 million for a hydroelectric project on the 
Niger River. Under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, AID assistnace to 
Nigeria rose to unparalleled heights: $27.4 million in fiscal year 
1963 and $46.0 million in fiscal year 1964. 109 
Aid from the United States accounted for little more than one-
third of all Nigeria's economic assistance from the West, 110 and the 
United Kingdom remained the largest source of aid, trade and invest-
107 Emerson, p. 26. 
108united States Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1962 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 
1962), p. 866. 
109u. S. Agency for International Development, "U. S. Economic 
Aid to Africa," Africa Report, Vol. 9 (December, 1964), Table, p. 10. 
110 . Emerson, p. 39. 
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ment. 111 Nevertheless, the United States offered Nigeria an opportunity 
to reduce her dependence on the former colonial power. The fact that 
Nigeria embarked on a $1.9 million six year development plan in 1962 
increased her susceptibility to foreign utilitarian inducements,112 
while Congressional curtailment of United States aid to other African 
countries gave credibility to the prospect of a reduction of economic 
assistance if Nigeria displeased United States' decision-makers. 
The identitive capabilities of the United States during 1960-66 
were higher for Nigeria than for many other African countries. A com-
mon heritage of British institutions, language and culture provided an 
identitive bond between United States' and Nigerian leaders, while a 
remarkably peaceful transition to independence from the United Kingdom· 
left little or no hostility to be transferred to Britain's most powerful 
ally. The identitive power of the United States on the eve of Nigeria's 
independence was reflected in the 1959 manifestoes of the three major 
Nigerian political parties. The Northern Peoples'. Congress (NPC) de-
clared that Nigeria ~'should aim at retaining and expanding her existing 
ties of friendship with the United States of America. 11113 The National 
Convention of Nigerian Citizens, the NPC's partner in the governing coa-
lition, stated: 11 Needless to emphasize our deep admiration of and 
affection for the United States, its ways of life, its championship of 
freedom and equality of man everywhere and no less important, its great-
111 Schwarz, pp. 287-89. 
112 Ibid., p. 297. 
113oaily Times (September 18, 1959), p. 6. 
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ness ... 114 The President of the opposition party, the Action Group, was 
initially even more outspoken in insisting that Nigeria 11 Should not 
hesitate to make her attitude, towards the ideals for which the Western 
Democracies stand, clear beyond any shadow of a doubt ... 115 Later the 
Action Group became more critical of close identification with the West. 
The identitive capabilities of the United States, vis-a-vis Nigeria, 
increased during the Administration of President Kennedy, whom even 
such critics of the United States as Ghana•s Nkrumah admired. 116 During 
the visit of Nigerian Prime Minister Balewa to the United States in 1961, 
he 11Was particularly impressed by the amount of time which the President 
devoted to him, as well as by the President•s knowledge of Africa ... 117 
Assistant Secretary of State William's vigorous support of African 
causes, while offensive to some European officials, was warmly appre-
ciated by Nigerians. Since Williams remained at his post until 1966, 
and President Johnson stressed the continuity of his policies with those 
of Kennedy, changes in the orientation of the Johnson Administration 
toward Nigeria were not apparent for some time. 
It was Africa's good fortune that the United States chose to 
direct its formidable capabilities as a nuclear superpower toward other 
parts of the world. United States• nuclear superiority over the Soviet 
Union was demonstrated in the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962. 118 Counter-
43 
insurgency capabilities were developed in ',the Anny Special Forces, which 
f . f 1 d d . th K d Ad . . t t. 119 I Af . h grew 1 ve- o Url ng e enne y m1 n1 s ra 1.0n. n r1 ca, owever, 
the United States preferred to work through the United Nations. A 
coalition was forged between the United States and the bulk of African 
states, including Nigeria, to support the United Nations Operations in 
the Congo, which the Soviet Union and France opposed. 12° Covert opera-
tions of the CIA contributed to the overthrow of Lumumba in Congo-Kin-
shasa, but there is no evidence of similar involvement by the CIA in 
other parts of Africa. 121 The fact that Africa was still the 11 Dark 
Continent," not only to a majority of Americans but to Soviet leaders, 
as well, may have helped it to avoid becoming a Cold War battleground 
comparable to Southeast Asia. 
Characteristics of Nigeria 
United States' decision-makers in the early 1960's perceived Ni-
geria to have the 11 brightest prospects of any nation on the continent 
for development of its {the United States') Western style of democra-
cy ... 122 Nigeria was moderate in leadership and seemingly stable poli-
tically, with a competitive party system, the trappings of Westminster 
democracy, and an official policy of 11 non-alignment 11 whiCh, in practice,· 
119 Sorensen, p. 632. 
120Ernest W. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the U. N. 
Congo Operation {Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1967), p. 77i 
King Gordon, The United Nations in the Con o: A uest for Peace (New 
York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962 , p. 0 • 
121 Bruce Oudes, "The CIA and Africa," Africa Report, vo 1. 20 
{July-August, 1974)~ p. 50. 
122waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa {New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 322. 
manifested decidedly pro-Western learnings. 
Prime Minister Balewa stated: 11 We Nigerians are friends of the 
United States. There is no doubt about it. We want that friendship 
to become stronger ... 123 During Nigeria•s first week of independence, 
its government announced that it would send a battallion to support 
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the United Nations forces in the Congo. 124 Although the United States 
was readily allowed to open an embassy in lagos, opening of a Soviet 
embassy was postponed. Balewa claimed that the Soviet Premier had 
demanded 11 0n opening an embassy forthwith ... 125 The Nigerian Prime 
Minister declared: 11 We will not be bullied, and I told him (Khrushchev) 
that protocol must be followed and we would consider an application in 
126 the proper form.•• Nigeria neither sought nor received economic aid 
from Communist countries during its first year of independence, while 
the officially non-aligned state received substantial aid from western 
countries. 
Balewa•s support came from the feudal Fulani aristocracy of 
northern Nigeria. Described by The New York Times as 11 the Quiet 
Nigerian, .. who shunned ideologies, 127 he was not the sort of person 
to whom Marxism or any other radical doctrine would have any appeal. 
123Quoted in The New York Times (October 3, 1960), p. 3. 
124The New York Times (October 5, 1960), p. 20. 
125The New York Times (November 3, 1960), p. 13. 
126Ibid. 
127The New York Times (October 7, 1960)~ p. 16. 
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Among Nigeria's many attractions to the United States was its 
liberal investment code. The petroleum code of the Balewa government 
limited the government's share of oil profits to 35 percent, "little 
th h 1 f th t t k b th . t. t. II 128 Th more an a a a en y e maJor expor 1ng na 1ons .. • e 
government provided foreign investors with such incentives as acceler-
ated depreciation allowances, relief from import duties, and a low 
income tax. 
Few Western observers realized the seriousness of political unrest 
in the country surrounding the treason trial of the major Action Group 
leader, chief Awalowo, in 1962-63; the bitter controversy over the 1963 
census results which determined representation in the national parlia-
ment; nor the riots in 1960 and 1964 by members of the Tiv ethnic 
group which demanded greater autonomy from the Fulani-dominated govern,.. 
ment of the Northern Region. The significance of these events, which 
. contained seeds of the 1966 coups and the civil war, were masked by 
the facade of Westminster-style democracy. 
128 Odell, p. 90. 
CHAPTER III 
DETERIORATING RELATIONS, 1967 TO 1970 
The first major strains in relations between Nigeria and the United 
States occurred during the Nigerian Civil War from 1967 to 1970. Under 
both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, United States• policy was 
essentially the same: to remain uninvolved in the war, while officially 
opposing secession and refusing to recognize the rebel government of 
Biafra, on the one hand, and providing 11 humanitarian aid 11 to starving 
Biafrans, on the other. 1 Washington, thereby, managed to antagonize 
both sides in the conflict. 
The Federal Military Government (F.M.G.) expressed resentment at 
the United States Government•s denial of export permits for arms pur-
chases from commercial manufacturers in the United States. 2 Spokesmen 
for the F.M.G. charged that the embargo was imposed 11 in full knowledge 
of the fact that Biafra was receiving a relatively unrestricted flow of 
1For the official position of the United States toward the Nigerian 
Civil War, see .. Department Statement, 11 United States Department of State 
Bulletin (September 11, 1967), p. 320; President Lyndon B. Johnson, 
11 Additional U. S. Contribution Authorized for Nigerian Relief, 11 United 
States Department of State Bulletin (November 25, 1968), pp. 543-44; 
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, 11 The Tragedy of Nigeria, .. 
United States Department of State Bulletin (December, 1968), p. 653; 
11 Department Reviews U. S. Efforts to Aid Victims of the Nigerian Civil 
War, .. Department of State Bulletin (August 4, 1969), pp. 94-97. 
211 Position of the United States Clarified, .. Africa Report, Vol. 12, 
(October, 1967), p. 55. 
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arms from unauthorized arms dealers, some of whom were American. 113 
The United States• position was regarded in Lagos as one of 11 thinly 
disguised support" for Biafra, motivated by a desire to secure "cheap 
oil supplies."4 When Biafrans used American made planes in its bombing 
raids, the F.M.G. issued an official protest to the United States Em-
bassy in Lagos. 5 Secretary of State Rusk's declaration that the United 
States would not become more actively involved because Nigeria was "a 
British responsibility" 6 was taken by the F.M.G. as an insulting insin-
uation of a neo-colonial relationship between Lagos and London. 
The F.M.G. also protested the 11 humani~arian" contacts between the 
United States and Biafra, which: 
had distinct political implications. First of all, it involved 
direct dealings with the Biafran authorities, which consider-
ably str~ngthened the status of Biafra in striving for recog~ 
nition. Secondly, the establishment of contact with (the Bia-
fran) re:gime led to an increase in pressure by the Biafran 
lobby in the United States for some kind of diplomatic rela-
tions.? 
Deutsch observes that "failure to respond to a group, a community, or 
individuals in situations which are crucial and highly salient to 
3w. B. Ofuatey-Kodje, 11 Conflicting Political Interests of Africa 
and the United States," FrederickS. Arkhurst, ed., United States 
Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 210. 
4The New York Times (August 24, 1967), p. 15; Richard P. Stebbins, 
The United States in World Affairs, 1967 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1968), p. 246. ' 
5 ' Suzanne Cronje, The World and Nigeria (London: Sidgwick and 
Johnson~ 1972), p. 229. 
6"Position of the United States Clarified," p. 55. 
7zdenak Cervenka, The Nigerian War, 1967-70 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Bernard Graefe Verlag fur Wehrwesen, 1971), p. 126. 
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them would be one of the strongest ways of destroying a conmunity. 118 
A variety of factors inhibited the ability of the United States to 
respond effectively to a situation which Nigerian leaders considered to 
be .. crucial and highly salient 11 damaged the bonds of community which 
had been developing between the two countries since 1960. 
Decision-Makers 
In contrast to the basic consensus among United States decision-
makers on foreign policy during 1960, there was a marked dissension 
among them on policies and priorities toward Nigeria and other countries 
during 1967-70. Intensification of the War in Indochina, among other 
changes, profoundly altered the character of foreign policy decision-
making in the United States. 
Institutional Variables 
Significant differences in values and outlook among major govern-
mental units emerged by 1967. Within the executive branch, the most 
significant division affecting relations with Nigeria was that between 
the Bureau of African Affairs and the United States Embassy in Nigeria, 
on the one hand, and the other major agencies of foreign policy deci-
sian-making, on the other. As the war in Vietnam increasingly absorbed 
the attention of the President, his major ~taff advisers at the White 
House, the CIA, the Pentagon, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the 
top leadership of the State Department, however, the influence of the 
8Karl W. Deutsch, 11 Communication Theory and Political Integration, .. 
Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Politi-
cal Communities (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), p. 70. 
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Bureau of African Affairs diminished. Mid-1966, when the United States 
began bombing Hanoi and Haiphong oil depots and the demilitarized zone, 
and the United States "assumed the brunt of the offensive fighting"9 
in Vietnam, marked a major threshold in the shift of the United States' 
1. . . t. 10 po 1cy pr1or1 1es. 
The Bureau of African Affairs like most of the African states which 
formed its "constituency," opposed secession out of fear that "a sue-
cessful secession of Biafra from Nigeria could trigger a disastrous wave 
of civil wars throughout much of Africa. "11 The Bureau of African 
Affairs advocated Federal Military Government. 12 Other State Depart-
ment officials, however, including the Secretary of State, advised the 
President to adopt a neutral, non-involved position--a decision which 
was undoubtedly "influenced by the deep United States involvement in 
Vietnam." 13 
More fundamental institutional changes were the increased asser-
tiveness of Congressional liberals on foreign policy matters, and the 
increasing friction between the Administration and important elements 
9Hoopes, pp. 16-24; Destler, p. 117. 
10George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United State and 
Vietnam, revised edition (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1969), 
p. 183. 
11 Nielsen, p. 323; Cronje, p. 229; The Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government of the OAU, Fourth Ordinary Session in 1967, resolved 
to reiterate "their condemnation of secession in any Member States ... " 
Resolution ANG/Res. 51 (iv). 
12c · 229 ronJe, p. . 
13El Khawas, p. 414. 
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of the Senate leadership over foreign policy. After President Johnson 
failed to heed the letter of January, 1966, by twenty-nine Senators, 
calling for a bombing pause in Vietnam, relations between the Admin-
istration and Senate liberals became strained. In an article in May, 
1966 Chairman Fullbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
castigated the Johnson Administration for a 11 Fatal Arrogance of 
Power ... 14 Congressional liberals were by May, 1967, when the Nigerian 
Civil War erupted, changing the administration with taking insufficient 
initiatives in the United Nations to resolve the Nigerian conflict, 
and for inadequate relief assistance for Biafrans. 15 The self-styled 
11 humanitarian 11 spokesmen in Congress manifested greater sympathy for 
the plight of Biafra than was evident from either faction tn the State 
Department. 
Idiosyncratic Variables 
By 1967, continuity between the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions, in terms of key personnel concerned with policies towardNigeria, 
had terminated. The ••New Africa Group, 11 which was the nucleus of pro-
African sentiment among the. ex-Kennedy advisers, 16 gradually disinte-
grated with the death of Stevenson in 1965, the resignation of Williams 
and Fredericks in 1966, and the isolation of Bowles as Ambassador to 
14J. William Fulbright, 11 The Fatal Arrogance of Power, .. New York 
Times Magazine (May 15, 1966), p. 29. 
15col in Legum, 11 The United States and Africa, 11 Col in Legum and 
John Drysdale, ed., Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-1969 (London: 
Africa Research, Ltd., 1969), p. 36. · . 
16Hilsman, pp. 245-46. 
India. Legum remarks that preoccupation with Indochina, inter-alia, 
11made it easier for Dean Rusk--never an enthusiast for the forward 
looking policies initiated in the Kennedy era--to pursue his lukewarm 
policies to Africa without much difficulty after the departure of 
Kennedy men like G. Mennen Williams and, especially J. Wayne Freder-
. k 11 17 lC S. 
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The principal Kennedy holdovers in the upper echelons of power in 
1967 were Secretary of Defense McNamara and Walter Rostow. The former 
was 11 a rational activist, with a very thin grounding in foreign 
affairs .... 1118 the latter, an economist whose elaborate theories of 
development contributed to his virtual fixation on Vietnam as the cri-
tical battleground of the Cold War. 19 Neither of these most influential 
of Johnson•s advisers showed much interest in Africa, 20 nor did Clark 
Clifford, the Washington lawyer, who succeeded McNamara in 1968. 
When President Nixon came to the White House in 1969, he was 
expected to adopt a policy more favorable to Biafra, because of state-
ments which he had made during the election campaign. He had charged 
that: 
Until now efforts to relieve the Biafran people have been 
thwarted by the desire of the central government of Nigeria 
to pursue total and unconditional victory, and by the fear 
of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities 
and genocide.21 
17 Legum, p. 32. 
18Hoopes, p. 18. 
19 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
20 rbid., p. 21; Irish and Frank, p. 237. 
21 Quoted in Cronje~ p. 226. 
However, in office, he was dissuaded from more active relief measures 
for Biafra by, inter-alia, 11 the apparent anti-Biafran stance of Dr. 
Kissinger in the White House ... 22 
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During the first term of the Nixon Administration, Dr. Kissinger, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, exerted 
11 mOre effective influence upon foreign-policy decisions than either 
Secretary of State Rogers or the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird ... 23 
In his book, The Necessity of Choice, Kissinger identified Nigeria as 
the African country deserving top priority. 11 The best method of 
having a major impact on many countries, .. he explained, 
will be to make a going concern of~ country. India in Asia, 
Brazil in Latin America, Nigeria in, Africa could become mag-
nets and examples for their regions if we acted with the bold-
ness and on the comparative scale of the Marshall Plan.24 
Unlike the leading decision-makers of the Johnson Administration, 
Kissinger shared the 11 0ne-Nigeria 11 sympathies of the Bureau of African 
Affairs in the State Department and the United States Embassy in Lagos. 
Personnel changes in the Bureau of African Affairs and the United 
States Embassy in Nigeria, likewise, contributed to fragmentation in 
United States policy toward the country. Joseph Palmer II, who suc-
ceeded Williams as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
22oye Ogunbadejo, 11 Nigeria and the Great Powers, .. p. 19. 
23 Irish and Frank, p. 11. 
24Henr,y A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1962), p. 336. 
had been the United States Ambassador to Nigeria for six years. Con~ 
sequently, he assigned higher priority to the Nigerian crisis. His 
personal sympathies were strongly pro-federal and anti-Biafran. In 
June, 1967, he said that the only solution favored by the Bureau was 
one which maintained the unity of Nigeria, and in July, 1968 told the 
Supreme Commander of the F.M.G. that 11 it was the wish of the United 
States Government that Nigeria•s Federal Republic of States remain a 
unified indivisible country ... 25 
Elbert Matthews, Palmer•s successor in Lagos, inherited Palmer•s 
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policies and staff, and with Palmer in the State Department as his 
invnediate superior, the new Ambassador had no incentive to seek a 
fresh approach. Indeed, he soon began issuing statements 11more openly 
in support of Nigeria than Washington•s stance of neutrality would 
have dictated ... 26 The contrast between the pro-F.M.G. statements of 
Assistant Secretary Palmer and Ambassador Mathews, on the one hand, 
and the .. frigid disinterest1127 of Secretary of State Rusk, on the 
other, gave the impression of a foreign policy which was inconsistent 
or insincere. 
Additional confusion concerning the United States• position was 
created by the self-styled 11 humanitarian 11 voices in the U. S. Sen-
ate--especially Senators Edward Kennedy, Charles Goodall and Eugene 
McCarthy. Kennedy charged that the Johnson administration had 11 done 
25cronje, p. 229. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Legum, p. 32. 
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fittle or nothing to feed the starving or end the war. 1128 In January, 
1969, Goodall organized a large-scale relief donations program in con-
junction with a 11 Biafran Christian ship. 1129 McCarthy went further in 
advocating that the United States 11 accept Biafra's right to separate 
nat i ona 1 independence. u30 
On the other hand, the F.M.G. also had its supporters in Congress, 
notably the black Senator, Edward V. Brooke, who denounced the Head of 
the Biafran Government. 11 0nce before in modern history, 11 Brooke told 
the Senate African Affairs Subcommittee in 1968, 11 a national leader 
chose to rule or die, and to take his people with him. 1131 
Confronted with these differences of opinion, President Nixon ap-
pointed an official fact-finding mission led by Representative Charles 
C. Diggs, a black member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee. After touring Nigeria and Biafra in Febru-
ary, 1969, the Mission upheld the positions of the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations. 32 
The dissension among the different decision makers was resolved, 
by both the Johnson and the Nixon Administrations, by adopting a posi-
tion of ambivalent neutrality. 
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Demands 
The involvement of actors outside the government in shaping United 
States' policy toward the Nigerian conflict was considerable, although 
the extent of their influence is difficult to measure. United States' 
policy was "vigorously opposed by a pro-Biafran lobby that extends 
across the spectrum of American political opinion ... 33 The most active 
elements of the lobby were Biafran students, who made up the largest 
contingent of some 1,400 Nigerians studying in the United States; and 
missionaries, whose humanitarian concerns may have been reinforced by 
the fact that Biafra contained the largest Christian population in 
Nigeria. 34 
The fact that the. Biafran leadership was "strongly pro-Western 
and imbrued with the values of the private enterprise system1135 ap-
pealed to conservatives in the United States; and the fact that Portu-
gal and South Africa, were actively aiding the Biafran cause,36 also 
33Richard L. Sklar, 11 The United States and the Biafran War," 
Africa Report, Vol. 14 (November, 1969), p. 22. 
34A majority of the population of the Eastern Region was Christian, 
primarily Catholic, while only 3.5 percent of the politically dominant 
Northern Region was Christian. While General Gowan, the supreme com-
mander of the F.M.G., was a Christian and some 40 percent of the popu-
lation in the Western Region was Protestant, the prominence of northern-
ers in the new government and in the mobs who had slaughtered tens of 
thousands of Easterners before the Civil War gave religious overtones 
to the conflict. 
3511 Nl'ge··r,·a," L d D d 1 d 563 egum an rys a e, e., p. . 
36 Ibid. 
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helped to marshall support for Biafra among American sympathizers of 
those countries. The public relations firm of Selvage and Lee served 
as lobbying instrument for Portuguese interests, while South African 
viewpoints were presented in the United States by the firm of Co 11 i er, 
Shannon, Rill and Edwards. 37 
Undoubtedly most of the Biafra sympathizers in the United States 
were motivated by genuinely humanitarian concerns. The plight of the 
Biafrans 
was revealed in all its horror by the medium of television, 
which had already proved so effective in arousing a deep 
feeling about the war in Vietnam. Close-up pictures of 
·starving women seen in the living-rooms of millions of homes 
in western Europe and North America, roused a deep emotional 
response.38 
Thousands of New Yorkers, including Mayor John Lindsay and Archbishop 
Cooke, participated in the drive to fill a supply ship known as the 
"Biafran Christian Ship."39 
There were also influential groups whi~h exerted influence on 
behalf of the F.M.G. United States businessmen in Lagos persuaded 
in-coming ambassador Truehart of the advantages of 11 keeping Nigeria 
the largest single market for business enterprisen 40 in Africa. Gulf 
Oil, which had its major operations in territory controlled by the 
37Meisler, p. 6; Barbara Rogers, "Sunny South Africa: A Worldwide 
Propaganda Machine, 11 Africa Report, Vol. 22 (September-October, 1977), 
pp. 6-7. 
38Margery Perham, 11 Nigeria 1 s Civil War," Legum and Drysdale, eds., 
Africa Contemporary Record (London: Africa Research Ltd., 1969), pp. 
1-12. 
39charles E. Goodall~ p. 26. 
40c · 249 ronJe, p. . 
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F.M.G., lobbied for more active support of the central government. 41 
The United States was also dissuaded from supporting Biafra by 
the fact that a major ally, the United Kingdom, was supporting the 
F.M.G. and supplying it with arms. 42 The NATO allies were, thus, 
divided over the Nigerian conflict--Britain supporting the F.M.G., 
France and Portugal supporting Biafra. With major allies and domestic 
interest groups expressing such division on the issue, it was poli-
tically difficult for the United States government to take a decisive 
stand. 
Functional Requisites 
From the standpoint of United States• national security, the 
Nigerian conflict was complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union 
and the United Kingdom were supporting the same side. Consequently, 
the United States, 11 With far less at stake, preoccupied with Vietnam 
and its own internal problems and confident that Britain would hold 
the Western line against Communist infiltration, declared a formal 
arms embargo against both sides ... 43 
From an economic standpoint, more was at stake, but the national 
interest of the United States was difficult to determine. On the one 
hand, approximately three-fifths of Nigeria•s oil was located in Bia-
41 cronje, p. 39; Claire Sterling, 11 Can Nigeria Catch Up With Its 
Reputation, .. Reporter (May 19, 1966), p. 39. 
42charl es R. Nixon, 11 Ni geri a and Bhfra, .. Steven L. Spi ege 1 and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, ed., Conflict in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Winthrop Publishers, Inc;, 1971L p. 295-296; 11 Position of the United 
States Clarified, .. p. 55. 
43 John De St. Jorre, The Brothers War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
Co., 1972), p. 181. 
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fra, 44 and Nigerian crude had become more valuable since the closure 
of the Suez Canal in mid-1967. On the other hand, the success of Bia-
fran secession would have meant the disintegration of tropical Africa•s 
largest market, and a potential precedent for further fragmentation 
elsewhere in Africa. Between the outbreak of the civil war in May, 
1967 and April, 1969, United States• private investment in F.M.G. con-
trolled Nigeria roughly doubled, from about $200 million to about $400 
million. 45 Petroleum production declined from 580,000 to 55,000 bar-
rels per day during the first year of the war, but by mid 1969 it had 
surpassed pre-war levels. By the end of 1969, the F.M.G. recaptured 
virtually all of the oilfields, which were producing 1 million barrels 
46 of o i 1 a day. . United States • companies accounted for 17 percent of 
federal Nigeria's $381 million worth of oil exports in 1969--second 
only to the British share of 22 percent. 47 
From the standpoint of domestic stability, the Nigerian Civil War 
coincided with a period of intense unrest inside the United States. 
Vietnam and Cambodia, not Nigeria, were the major foreign policy 
issues, even for American blacks. Public opinion polls during the 
period indicate a strong antipathy among blacks to the Vietnam War, 
which was viewed as 11another example of blacks being given the dirty 
44 Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story (Baltimore: Penguinn Books, 
1969) ' p. 1 07. 
45c · 246 ronJe, p. . 
46 .. Sayre P. Schatz, 11A Look at the Balance Sheet, .. Africa Report, 
15 (January, 1970), p. 19. Vol. 
47 Pearson and Pearson, p. 14. 
and dangerous jobs to do by the white majority. . 1148 On college 
campuses, Biafra was eclipsed by Indochina as a target for protest. 
The principal manifestations of public concern about the situation in 
Nigeria came from middle class liberals on the east coast. 49 
Capabilities 
59 
The coercive capabilities of the United States were heavily com-
mitted to Vietnam when the Nigerian Civil War erupted. By December, 
1966, United States troop levels in Vietnam had reached 362,000, 50 and 
the United States was dropping a larger weekly tonnage of bombs on 
North Vietnam than the total .. amount dropped on Germany at the peak of 
World War 11. 51 An active military presence in Nigeria, or even the 
risk of extensive involvement in the Nigerian conflict by supplying 
munitions to one or another of the belligerents, would have been diffi-
cult or impossible, both politically and militarily. Stebbins notes 
that, having recently been condemned by many African states for the 
Stanleyville airlift, the United States was inclined to be cautious 
about any military response to the Nigerian war. 52 
Any identitive assets which the United States may have given 
Nigeria were quickly depleted by the unresponsive behavior and state-
48Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, Viet-
nam. and the Silent Majority (New York: Harper and Row, 1970, p. 7-s:-
49 Gooda 11 , p. 26. 
50committee of Asian Scholars, The IndoChina Story (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1970), p. 322. 
51 The New York Times (August 21, 1966), p. 14. 
52Richard D. Stebbins,, The United States in World Affairs, 1967 
(New Yor~: Simon and Schuster, 1968), p. 246. 
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ments of the United States, especially Secretary Rusk's insulting state-
ment that Nigeria was a British responsibility. 53 A speech by Under-
secretary of State Katzenbach in 1968 did not endear the United States 
to either side in the Nigerian war by accusing both sides of subordin-
ating the lives of innocent persons to political and tactical advan-
54 tage. 
In terms of utilitarian assets, the United States provided more 
economic assistance to Nigeria than to any other African country dur-
ing 1967-70. Bilateral aid from the United States to Nigeria rose from 
$21.3 million in fiscal year 1968 to $32.6 million in fiscal year 
1971, 55 and Nigeria received one in five of the 10,500 United States 
technical experts who were sent to Africa in 1968--the largest share of 
56 any African country. For a country in the midst of a war, however, 
the estimated $10.7 million worth of military aid which the Soviet 
Union gave Nigeria in 1969 alone57 was undoubtedly more valued by the 
F.M.G. than the purely economic assistance which the United States 
provided. 
Moreover, the F.M.G. resented the relief which the United States 
provided to Biafran civilians because of potential recognition and 
53"Position of the United States," p. 55. 
54Legum, p. 33. 
55united States Agency for International Development, in The New 
York Time Almanac 1970 (New York: The New York Times, 1969), p. 703 
and in The Official Associated Press Almanac (New York: Almanac Pub-
lishing Company, Inc., 1973), p. 594. 
56Pol Guyomarch, "Africa and the U. S. A.," Africa '71 (New York: 
Africana Publishing Co., 1970), p. 62. 
57oominique Duault, "Africa and the U.S.S.R.," Africa '71 (New 
York: Africana Publishing Co., 1970), ,P· 91. 
58 propaganda value to the Biafran government from such contacts. By 
July 1, 1969, the United States Government had given $60 million in 
relief aid for Biafra, and private United States citizens had ~iven 
more than $10 million additional assistance. 59 President John~on 
explained that 11 While we have no intention of interfering in Nigerian 
affairs, we do not believe innocent persons should be made victims of 
political maneuvering ... 60 In sum, the capabilities of the United 
States were not only limited, relative to the magnitude of Nigeria's 
needs, but were expended in ways which the F.M.G. perceived as un-
responsive or detrimental to its needs. 
Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria 
61 
The Nigerian war, and the events during the previous year which 
,.>recipitated it, caused great disappointment in Washington, and a fun-
damental reassessment of the country on the part of United States• 
decision-makers. A country which had been hailed as a 11 Showcase 11 of 
stability and democracy in Africa had experienced, between January, 
1966 and the end of May, 1967, Nigeria had experienced the assassina-
tions of two heads of government, two bloody coups d'etat, and the 
massacre of several thousand Eastern Nigerians in genocidal pogroms in 
Northern Nigeria. 
The United States had shown no compunctions about backing military 
58 Audrey Smock, 11 The Politics of Relief, 11 Africa Report, Vol. 15 
(January, 1970), p. 25. 
59 Ibid., p. 24. 
60President Johnson, .. Additional U. S. Contribution Authorized for 
Nigerian Relief, .. p. 544. 
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governments of dubious stability which had come to power through assas-
sination in Southeast Asia--even when accompanied by genocidal massa-
cres, as was true in Indonesia. Yet in Southeast Asia, the military 
governments which the United States sponsored came to power in coun-
tries which were considered vulnerable to Communist or pro-Communist 
penetration. In the case of Indonesia, the programs were directed 
against suspected Communist sympathizers. In Nigeria, leaders who were 
overthrown and murdered in both coups were friendly to the United 
States; and the Ibo victims of the Massacres were perceived by Americans 
as 11 a highly talented, industrious, westernized, and above all Christian 
people. 1161 Moreover, the Federal Military Government, headed by mild-
mannered, Sandhurst-trained 11 Jack 11 Gowan, seemed in little danger of 
going Conmunist. 1162 
The potential of Nigeria as an oil rich nation containing "an ocean 
of oil, the purest in the world, 1163 as well as Black Africa•s largest 
market, was sufficiently appreciated by United States private economic 
interests in Nigeria, especially Gulf Oil Corporation and Mobil Oil 
Corporation, to induce them to lobby actively against more extensive 
aid to Biafra. 64 Yet it is apparent that economic logic was outweighed 
by other factors shaping United States •. responses to Africa, in general, 
which were governed: 
61 ofuatey-Kodje, p. 210. 
62ogunbadejo, p. 18. 
63 Forsyth, p. 107. 
64 Smock, p. 26. 
partly by preoccupation with Vietnam and Asia; partly by the 
loss of idealistic interest in the new African states, because 
they were.not behaving like Jeffersonian model democracies; 
partly by diminiShed belief in Africa's capacity to mobilize 
effective, independent power in the foreseeable future, and, 
partly, by a lessening of anxiety about Russia.65 
Cold War reflexes and racial stereotypes about the 11 Dark Continent .. 
precluded a more decisive response to the Nigerian problem. 
65 Legum, p. 32. 
63 
CHAPTER IV 
UNFRIENDLY RELATIONS, 1970 TO 1976 
During the half-decade following the end of the Nigerian Civil War 
in January, 1970, relations between the United States and Nigeria deter-
iorated to their lowest point in history. In January, 1970, Dr. Kissin-
ger submitted his National Decision Memorandum to President Nixon. The 
memorandum endorsed the second of four options presented in National 
Security Staff Memorandum,--Option Two, calling for the United States to 
increase contacts with the white-ruled governments of southern Africa. 
Pursuant to this recontnendation, the African policy of the Nixon and 
Ford Administrations emphasized improving relations with the white-ruled 
countries of southern Africa, on the assumption that: 11 the whites are 
here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about 
is through them. 111 This orientation by the United States contributed 
to increasing insensitivity to the interests of Nigeria, which had 
adopted a new role of activism in foreign relations and militant oppo-
sition to continued white rule in Africa. 2 
The tone of communications between the two countries reveals 
1see Bruce Oudes, 11 Southern African Policy Watershed, .. Africa 
Report, Vol. 19 (November-December, 1974), p; 50: Text of Option 2 of 
NSSM 39. 
2Jean Herskovits, 11Nigeria: Africa's New Power, .. Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 3 (January, 1975), p. 321; Herskovits, 11 Nigeria: Africa's:Emerg-
i ng New Power, 11 p. 16-17. 
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that an unusual degree of hostility had been reached by 1976. Presi-
dent Ford•s letter to African leaders, suggesting that they support a 
Cuban withdrawal from Angola in order to obtain a withdrawal of South 
African forces from Angola, was published by the Nigerian government, 
along with an angry reply from the Nigerian Supreme Commander, General 
Murtala Muhammed, that: 
Nigeria rejects completely this fatuous attempt by the Ford 
Administration to insult the intelligence of African nations 
and scorn the dignity of the black man. It totally repudiates 
the fake logic that equates the presence of the Cuban and 
Soviet advisers in Angola with that of South African regular 
tr?ops~ their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercen-
anes.j 
At an Organization of African Unity meeting in Addis Ababa, General 
Muhammed denounced the western powers for refusing to take any action 
against South Africa•s presence in Angola, and he again criticized 
President Ford•s letter. The reply issued by the United States De-
partment of State expressed regret that the Nigerian Government had 
chosen to publish a personal communication from the President of the 
United States, and accused Nigeria of making 11 Unjustified accusations 
against the United States and of gratuitously impugning American 
policy in Angola.•.4 
The continuation of hostilities led to the anti-American demon-
strations in Laogs, Kaduna, and lbadan. On January 11, 1976, some 
two thousand Nigerians attacked the United States Embassy. Some of 
the demonstrators 11 broke into the grounds of the Embassy, plastered 
311 Lagos Rebuked by Washington for Impugning Angola Policy, .. The 
New York Times (January 9, 1976), p. 2. 
4Ibid. 
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slogans on the windows, and threw sticks and stones at the building. 115 
After the attempted coup d'etat in which General Mohammed was assassi-
nated, demonstrators once again attacked the U. S. Embassy, claiming 
American complicity in the plot and shouting .. C.I.A. must go! 116 Nigeria 
refused to receive Secretary of State Kissinger during his tour of 
Africa in April, 1976, because of .. inconvenient timing ... ? 
In attempting to explain how relations between two once friendly 
countries could have reached such depths of ill-feeling, a variety of 
interacting factors deserve consideration. 
Decision-Makers 
The Nixon and Ford Administrations saw the consummation of two 
trends which had begun during the previous period: the increasing 
centralization of the machinery of the executive branch for making 
foreign policy decisions and the increasing assertiveness of Congress 
in foreign policy decisions. 
Institutions 
Within the Executive Branch, the influence of the President's 
National Security Affairs Assistant and his .. tightly controlled .. staff 
increased at the expense of the State Department and the Foreign Ser-
511 Nigerians Attack American Embassy Over Angolan Issue,.. The New 
York Times (January 12,11976}, p. 5. 
611 Nigeria, 11 Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76 (New York: Afri-
cana Publishing Co., 1976), p. B-799. 
7Ibid. 
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vice. 8 In August, 1973, when Kissinger became Secretary of State, while 
retaining his position as National Security Affairs Assistant,: the State 
Department bureaucracy relegated to an inferior position vis-a-vis the 
National Security Staff. Kissinger 
continued to spend his mornings at his White House office, 
and even when he spent time at the State Department he re-
mained communication with his NSC deputy, Brigadier General 
Brent Snowcroft. Top specialists in the State Degartment 
were rarely let in on his major policy decisions.9 
Consequently, the influence of the regional bureaus of the State De-
partment diminished. Under a Secretary of State whose energies were 
absorbed in "shuttle diplomacy .. with Hanoi, Saigon, Peking, Moscow, 
and the capitals of the Middle East, the influence of the Bureau of 
African Affairs declined even more than the others. President Nixon•s 
delay, after his inauguration, in appointing a new Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs was taken ·by some observers as an indica~ 
tion of the low priority which the President attached to Africa, 10 
The repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1970 signalled 
greater assertiveness on the part of Congress on foreign policy matters.· 
Congress became bolder as the Watergate hearings weakened the authority 
of the President.' In November, 1973, the War Powers Act imposed a limit 
of 90 days on the President•s authority to dispatch combat troops with-
out specific Congressional approval, and gave Congress the power to stop 
the movement of troops without a presidential veto. 
9Ibid.' p. 229. 
10colin Legum, 11 America•s Year in Africa, .. Africa Contemporary 
Record, 1969-70 (Exeter: Africa Research Ltd., 1970), p. 41. 
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From the standpoint of relations between the United States and 
Nigeria, the greater prominence of Congress in foreign policy produced 
. mixed results. Congressional action did limit a course of United 
States' actions in Angola which jeopardized relations with Nigeria. 
Congress voted overwhelmingly, by a margin of 323 to 99, to reject 
President Ford's appeal for aid to the FNLA/UNITA forces in their 
struggle against the MPLA, which Nigeria recognized as the rightful. 
governing party in Angola. On the other hand, Congress also effectively 
opposed the Nixon and Ford Administrations two areas on which adminis-
tration policy coincided with Nigerian policy: sanctions against 
Rhodesia and foreign aid. 
Dr. Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers, in support of inter-
national legal obligations under the United Nations Charter and the 
wishes of an ally, the United Kingdom, voiced their opposition to 
Congressional efforts to remove certain sanctions against trade with 
the regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. Yet the 1971 amendment to the 
Military Procurement Act authorizinq the purchase of Rhodesian chrome 
was passed by Congress through the initiatives of Senator Byrd of 
11 Virginia, Union Carbide and the Foote Mining Company. Driven by "a 
fierce desire to place restraints on the presidential foreign policy 
making powers," 12 the Senate rejected the administration's entire for-
eignaid bill in 1971, and forced the Nixon Administration into com-
promises which, inter alia, provided the smallest amount of overseas 
11 Aaron Segal, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contem-
porary Record, 1971-1972 {New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 
1972), p. A 134. 
12Ibid., p. 133. 
69 
decade. As a result economic assistance to Nigeria declined by nearly 
one-quarter, or $7.7 million, between fiscal year 1971 and fiscal year 
1972,13 at a time when Nigeria's remarkable economic growth was still 
insufficient to meet her ambitious plans for development of transpor-
tation and industry. 
A noteworthy development in Congress during the period was the 
consolidation of an effective black voting group~ with an interest in 
Africa, in the House of Representatives: the Congressional Black 
Caucus, {CBC). The CBC formed in 1971, and by 1975 it was one of the 
best-financed of the nine unofficial caucusing groups in the House, 
with one of the largest staffs. 14 President Ford acknowledged the 
importance of the CBC when he met with it three days after his inaugu-
ration. Oude~ credits CBC pressure with Ford's reversal of his previous 
support of the Byrd Amendment. 15 Nevertheless, the influence of the 
CBC was offset by opposing blocs which were heavily influenced by lob·· 
byists for friendlier relations with southern Africa. In 1975, the 
House of Representatives defeated by a vote of 209 to 187 a bill en-
dorsed by President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger to repeal 
the Byrd Amendment. 
13united States Agency for International Development, in The Offi-
cial Associated Press Almanac 1973, p. 594 and The Official Associated 
Press Almanac 1974, p. 707~ . 
14see Marguerite Ross Barnett, 11 The Congressional Black Caucus, .. 
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 1 {1975), 
pp. 34-50. 
15sruce Dudes, 11 New Agenda for Africa Policy, .. Africa Report, Vol. 
19 {September-De tober, 197 4) , p ~ 54~ 
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Idiosyncratic Variables 
The most important personality variable during the period is that 
of Henry Kissinger. Not since the era of Secretary of State Dulles was 
foreign policy-making so heavily dominated by the personality of a 
single individual. Hughes claims that the United States had made so 
great an 11 0verinvestment in one exceptional man--Henry Kissinger 11 that 
11 ln the process, our national priorities have perforce become his pre-
ferences. Our national interests have become his interests ... 16 Even 
if Hughes may exaggerate the influence of individuals on United States• 
policy, it seems accurate to say that, not since the era of Secretary 
of State Dulles was foreign policy making in the United States so domi-
nated by a single official. Inasmuch as Kissinger had favored the 
Federal Military Government which eventually won the war, the subse-
quent deterioration of relations with Nigeria while Kissinger remained 
the leading architect of Unit~d States• policy requires an explanation. 
Three characteristics of Kissinger•s thought help to explain his 
problems in dealing with Nigeria: his 11 neo-classicaP view of world 
politics; his lack of experience with sub-Saharan Africa; and his pre-
ference for personal management of foreign policy. 
In his perceptive biography, Mazlish ascribes to Kissinger the 
.. Europeanization .. of American foreign policy, one of the 11 key elements 11 
of which 11 has been a ponderously conceptualized and updated version 
of the balance-of-power doctrines of the nineteenth century, especially 
16 Thomas L. Hughes, 11 Foreign Policy: Men or Measure? 11 Atlantic 
Monthly, vol. 234 (October, 1975), p. 53. 
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those of the Congress of Vienna that Kissinger had studied so intent~ 
1 .. 17 y. This perspective led Kissinger to regard the major world powers 
as the principal actors in international politics, and to be concerned 
with lesser powers primarily when their instability seemed to invite 
intervention by the great powers. Thus, Kissinger was interested in 
Nigeria when its civil war made it a potential object of such interven-
tion. When the war ended, and the Federal Military Government seemed 
secure again, his interest turned elsewhere. Hoagland remarks that 
Kissinger's .. global view of real politik had little place for Africa ... 18 
Kissinger dealt with Africa in three of the 370 pages of his book, 
The Necessity of Choice,19 but he had little familiarity with the 
continent. He had visited South Africa as a lecturer before taking 
public office, but he did not include tropical Africa in his busy 
itinerary of world travel until 1976. Kissinger's understanding of the 
developing countries was far more limited than his knowledge of the 
traditional world powers. 20 
Kissinger's personalistic leadership and distruct of the State 
Department bureaucracy recall the style of Dulles. Dudes complained 
that .. while he has no interest in or desire to consider African ques-
tions he is not willing to delegate authority to others to make policy 
(New 
19Kissinger, pp. 348-49 and p. 336. 
20Mazlish, p. 234. · 
in American Polic 
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d . . 1121 ec1s1ons. When he became Secretary of State, this attitude led to 
friction with the Bureau of African Affairs. 
David Newsom, who succeeded Palmer as Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs in late 1969, was a competent career diplomat who 
seemed content to follow dutifully the directives of his superiors. 
Newsom's previous African assignments had been north of the Sahara, 
as Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs and Ambassador 
to Libya. He had previous experience with Africa. Initially sharing 
"the orthodox critical view of South Africa of most of the State 
Department's African bureau at the beginning of his term,n22 Newsom 
later became a vocal defender of the Nixon Administration's increasingly 
friendly relations with the white-ruled regimes of Africa, for which 
he was commended by Radio South Africa. 23 
Donald Easum, who succeeded Newsom in 1974, was less compliant. 
Easum's three tours od duty in West Africa gave him an affinity for the 
black-ruled countries of that region. He was initially successful in 
persuading Kissinger to meet with the Nigerian National Day celebra-
tion. Yet Easum's support in United Nations for Guinea Bissau, which 
was governed by former anti-Portuguese guerrillas, led to open friction 
between the Assistant Secretary and Easum, whom Kissinger dubbed "Mr. 
21 Bruce Oudes, 11 The U. S. Year in Africa, 11 Africa Contemporary 
Record, 1974-75, p. 88. 
22 Ken Owens, Johannesburg Star (January 5, 1974), discussed in 
·George M. Houser, 11 U. S. Policy and Southern Africa," FrederickS. 
Arkhurst, ed., U. S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger, 1975), 
p. 89. 
23Hoagland, p. 367. 
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Guinea-Bissau ... 24 When Easum suggested, on a trip to Tanzania, that 
the United States might consider voting against South Africa•s continued 
membership in the United States, he was summarily dismissed from the 
Bureau, and 11 banished 11 to the post of Ambassador to Nigeria. 25 
Nathaniel Davis, whom Kissinger sponsored as Easum•s replacement 
in the Bureau of African Affairs in 1975, had been United States Ambas-
sador to Chile at the time of Allende•s overthrow, and his appointment 
was criticized by the Organization of African Unity•s Council of Minis-
ters. Kissinger•s caustic reply attacked 11 this unprecedented and harm-
ful act of the Council. 1126 Nevertheless, in the face of a continuing 
barrage of criticism from African leaders and African sympathizers in 
the United States, Davis resigned after serving only a few months as 
Assistant Secretary. Edward Mulcahy served as Acting Assistant Secre-
tary until 1976, when the position of Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs was filled by William Schaufle, the former Inspector General 
of the Foreign Service. 
The controversies surrounding Easum and Davis left an imprint on 
the decision-making process. Mulcahy spoke of 11 our beleaguered Africa 
Bureau ... 27 Kissinger continued to refer to the Bureau•s personnel as 
Vol. 
24Bruce Oudes, 11 The Sackin9 of the Secretary, .. Africa Report, 
20 (January-February, 1975), p. 17. 
25Ibid. 
26Quoted in Bruce Oudes, .. Kissinger Confronts Africa, .. Africa 
Report (March-April, 1975), p. 46. 
27Bruce Oudes, 11 The United States• Year in Africa: Poststript 
to the Nixon Years, .. Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, p. A ll8. 
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11 cry babies ... 28 In this atmosphere of unprecedented tension between 
the Bureau of African Affairs and the Secretary of State, it was diffi-
cult to make sound decisions concerning Nigeria and other African 
countries. 
Demands 
The policy of favoring relations with the white-ruled countries of 
Africa at the expense of friendly relations with Black Africa followed 
intense lobbying activities by the white regimes and private United 
States business corporations which had a stake in the continuation of 
those regimes. ·Arkhurst observed in 1975 that the black regi~es of 
Africa, unaccustomed to the workings of the political system in the 
United States, had neglected 11 to develop appropriate and judicious 
links with the sources of power in the American legislature, .. 29 and 
that the South African government alone was outspending tropical Africj 
in public relation efforts in the United States. 
The two principal lobbying organs of South Africa in the United 
States were the South Africa Foundation, which distributes propaganda 
favorable to South Africa•s cause to legislators and opinion leaders in 
the United States; and the firm of Collier, Shannon and Edwards, which 
uses a more direct interpersonal 11 networ~ of contacts on Capitol Hill, 
28 Ibid. 
29Frederick S. Arkhurst, ,.Introduction, .. Frederick S. Arkhurst, 
ed., U.S. Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 
1975), p. 7. 
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the administration, and key business as well as other circles 1130 to 
promote policy change toward South Africa. DeKieffer had friendly con-
tacts with General Snowcroft, Kissinger's top aide on the National 
Security Staff. Rogers claims that a meeting between the South Africa 
Foundation's president, Sir Francis Guingand, a.nd both Kissinger and 
President Nixon in 1969, was primarily respon~ible for the adoption 
31 
of Option Two of N.S.S.M. 39. 
The white governments of Africa found other champions among private 
individuals and companies in the United States. Two respected states-
men of the early Cold War era, former Secretary ofState Acheson and 
George Kennan, stressed the geopolitical necessity of maintaining anti• 
Communist powers on the Cape of Good Hope. 32 The African American 
Affairs Association 11Worked closely with other organizations supporting 
the Rhodesians, fostering American oil interests in Portuguese terri-
tories, and assisting the South African lobby in putting together 
irJfluential programs such as the South African Leadership Program ... 33 
Also active were a number of large business corporations. Over 
300 United States firms were doing business in South Africa by 1971, 
and United States investment was .. diversified and spread among many com-
panies, a number of which are major contributors to campaign funds of 
30sarbara Rogers, 11South Africa's Fifth Column in the United 
States, .. Africa Report, Vol. 22 (November-December, 1977), p. 15. 
31 Ibid., p. 14. 
32Mohamed A. El-Khawas, ''Kissinger on Africa: Benign Neglect? 11 
A Current Bibliographf on African Affairs, Vol. 7 (Winter, 1974), p. 5; 
Colin Legum, "Americas Year in Afr:ica," Africa Contemporary Record, 
1969-70, pp. 42-43. 
33 •, 
George W. Shepherd, 11 Comment, 11 United States Policy Toward 
Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 46. 
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both parties ... 34 Particularly active in supporting the chrome imports 
from Rhodesia were Union Carbide and the Foote Mining Company of Penn-
1 . 35 sy van1a. In 1973, private United States• investment totalled $1 
billion in South Africa ~nd some $265 million in other white-ruled 
territories. 36 Although United States• investment in independent Black 
Africa was approximately double that in white-ruled Southern Africa, 
and United States• investment in Nigeria alone was nearing the $1 bil-
lion mark, it was not clear that friendlier relations with the white-
ruled countries, if carefully pursued, would jeopardize investment in 
the black-ruled countries. 
Of critical importance was the position of Gulf Oil Corporation. 
Gu 1f had been a steadfast a 11 y of the Nigerian F edera 1 Mi 1 ita ry Govern-
ment during the Nigerian Civil War because of the company•s substantial 
investments in federally-controlled territory. However, Gulf had an 
even larger stake in the Cabinda enclave of Angola, which ~as ~nder 
Portuguese contra 1 until November, 1975. By mid-1973, Gulf had invested 
over $150 million in Cabinda, thereby providing most of United States 
investment in the Portuguese territories. 37 Cabinda represented approx-
imately ten percent of Gulf•s total world production. While Portugal 
controlled Angola, Gulf continued United States support of Portuguese 
34Hoagland, pp. 359-60. 
35w. A. E. Skurnik, 11 Recent United States Policy in Africa, .. 
Current History, Vol. 64 (March, 1Q73), p. 100. 
36David D. Newsom, 11 Department Reports to Congress on Aspects of 
United States Policy Toward Southern Africa, .. U. S. Department of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 68 (May 7, 1973), · p. 579. 
37 Ibid., p. 580. 
policy in Africa. By 1974, revenues from Gulf's production in Angola 
were paying for approximately three quarters of the Portuguese budget 
for military operations there. 38 11 Gulf became a public apologist for 
Portugal, saying that it was doing •good things• in Angola ... 39 
During the 1970's, organized opposition to the governments in 
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Africa also became significant, principally among liberal church groups, 
American blacks, and the Americans for Democratic Action. The National 
Council of Churches warned that several of its affiliated denominations· 
were considering withdrawal of some $4 billion.worth of securities 
which they held in companies doing business in white-ruled Southern 
Africa. The American Negro Leadership Conference, likewise brought 
together a group of black Americans to protest the United States• 
policies toward the white regimes. In 1972, Americans for Democratic 
Action attempted to organize a boycott against Gulf Oil Corporation 
40 because of its support of Portuguese Angola. The resources of these 
groups, however, were no match for those of their adversaries especially 
given the sympathetic orientation of the Nixon and Ford Administrations 
toward the white regimes. 
Functional Requisites 
United States security interests in 1970-76 reflected geopolitical 
38Louise Stack and Don Morton, Torment to Triumph in Southern 
Africa (New York: Friendship Press, 1976), p. 118. 
39 Ibid. 
40Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Poli-
tics (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 142. 
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concerns about British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean after 1968, and 
a Soviet naval buildup in the area there~fter. Since approximately 
half of the world's seaborne petroleum is in transit on the Ocean 
routes around Africa at any time, the military and economic implications 
of these developments were considered serious. Interest in the Indian 
Ocean increased during the 1973 war in the Middle East, after which 
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger announced that the United States pre-
sence in the Ocean was expected to be "more frequent and more regular 
than in the past."41 
Concern about the Indian Ocean increased as a result of two coups 
d'etat in 1974: the coup in Ethiopia which brought an unstable Marxist 
junta to power on the Horn; and the coup in Portugal, which brought 
about the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Mozambique and Angola, 
thereby opening northern South Africa and Namibia, and eastern Rhodesia, 
to intensified guerrilla infiltration. The increased vulnerability of 
South Africa was of concern to geopoliticians, who described it as a 
"southern Gibralter" and the "gatekeeper" to the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans. 42 
Pursuant to the philosophy of Option Two of NSSM 39 and the grow-
ing concern about the security of the Cape, the United States began 
gradually to relax restrictions upon indirect military assistance to 
Africa's white governments. Within a month after Kissinger's endorse-
ment of Option Two, the Nixon Administration authorized the sale of 
41 Quoted in David B. Johnson, 11 Indian Ocean: Troubled Waters for 
the U.S. Navy," Africa Report, Vol. 20 (January-February, 1975), p. 8. 
42Armed Forces Journal International, quoted in "Why the West Needs 
South Africa, 11 Africa Report, Vol. 20 (Jdnuary-February, 1975}, p. 20. 
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C-130 transport planes to a South African company, which used them for 
military transport. Subsequently, the United States shipped large 
amounts of weapons-grade enriched uranium to South Africa, and provided 
the Portuguese government with nearly $500,000,000 of economic assis-
tance in 1971 as "rent 11 for continued use of military bases in the 
. 43 
Azores. 
The power struggle between rival guerrilla factions in Angola 
after Portugal withdrew from the territory led to support of one of 
the belligerents by the United States, at the expense of friendly rela-
tions with Nigeria, which supported the opposing side 
Soviet support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) and covert CIA support for the rival National Front for 
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) began during the Kennedy Administration. 
State Department dissidents in the Bureau of African Affairs charged 
that Kissinger 11 Upped the ante 11 in January, 1975, by endorsing a CIA 
plan to provide $300,000 in covert aid to the FNLA. 44 Two months 
later, the Soviet Union shipped large quantities of arms to the MPLA. 
The increase in Soviet aid induced South Africa to send troops into 
Angola, allegedly to protect the Cunene Dam. This, in turn, prompted 
Cuba to dispatch 10,000 troops to support the MPLA. 
The intervention of South Africa in Angola led Nigeria, which had 
previously been neutral in the conflict, to recognize the MPLA, on 
November 25, 1975, as the legitimate government of Angola. A statement 
43skurnik, p. 98. 
44seymour Hersh, 11 Who Upped the Ante in Angola? 11 , The Washington 
Star (December 19, 1975), p. 9. 
by the Federal Military Government explained: 
There is now abundant evidence of racist South Africa•s troops 
in the conflict. The faction fighting against the MPLA are 
backed not only by South Africa, but by other interests which 
are clearly against Angolan independence and freedom in Africa. 
For this reason, Nigeria has to take the stand to recognize · 
MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola.45 
On the other hand, the increase in Soviet and Cuban support for the 
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MPLA prompted Kissinger to go before Congress, on January 29, 1976, to 
argue that an MPLA victory would 11 have repercussions throughout Africa .. 
which would be favorable to the Soviet Union. 46 President Ford sent a 
letter to Congress warning that: 
The United States cannot accept as a principle of international 
conduct that Cuban troops.and Soviet arms can be used for a 
wanton intervention in local conflicts in areas thous~nds of 
miles from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and where neither can 
claim an historic national interest. If we do so, we will 
send a message of irresolution not only to the leaders of 
African nations, but to U. S. allies and friends throughout 
the world.47 
Although a majority of Congress rejected the President•s arguments, his 
remarks illustrate the radical differences between the Ford Adminis-
tration•s assessment of international realities in Africa and that of 
the Nigerian decision-makers. 
The economic functional requisites of the United States would 
seem to have warranted greater concern for Nigeria•s goodwill than 
45Quoted in 11 Nigeria and Angola," Africa, No. 53 (January, 1976), 
p. 11. 
46Quoted in Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Angola," Africa 
Contemporary Record, 1975-76, p. A 20. 
47
"President Ford Reiterates U. S. Obje. tives in An9ola, 11 U. S. 
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 74 (February 16, 1976), p. 181. 
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United States policymakers disolayed. By 1970, Nigeria was producing 
over one million barrels of oil a day, more than twice the production 
before the Civil War. The value of Nigerian crude had risen to $381 
million. 48 By 1974, Nigeria was producing 2.3 million varrels of oil 
per day. 49 In 1974, Nigeria overtook Venezuela to become the second 
largest source of imported crude oil for the United States, and over-
took South Africa to become the leading African trading partner of 
the United States. 50 Nigerian oil was valued not only for its low 
sulphur content, but also as an alternative to Middle Eastern sources, 
which proved unreliable during the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74. In 
1971, Nigeria became the eleventh member of the Organization of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries, the producers cartel which controlled the 
global price of oil. 
Neverthel~ss, some aspects of economic relations with Nigeria 
were viewed by the United States as undesirable. The Nigerian petroleum 
law of November, 1969; the establishment of the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation (N.N.O.C.) in 1971; and the participation agreement of 1971 
with Philli~s Petroleum company, which gave the N.N.O.C. one-third of 
the equity in Phillips' Nigerian operations, marked the beginning of 
greater government participation in the petroleum industry. In 1974, 
the F.M.G. increased its share to 55 percent and concluded participation 
agreements with the remaining producers, including Gulf, Mobil, and 
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Texaco/Chevron. 51 Assistant Secretary of State Schaufele. attributed the 
decline of United States investment in Nigeria by $220 million during 
1974 to 11 the transfer of equity in U. S. petroleum firms to the Niger-
ian Government ... 52 
From the standpoint of domestic politics, Shepherd notes the rise, 
during the early 1970's, of an 11African constituency to a position of 
influence in American society and policy that it has not previously 
possessed~ 1153 as a result of its increasing political sophistication. 
As a product of the Black Power and African consciousness movements of 
the 1960's, the influence of middle class blacks 11 in interpreting 
Africa academically and publicly has grown rapidly and representatives 
of their point of view have begun to penetrate the highest echelons of 
American government, religion, business and finance ... 54 Vet this 
· 
11 constituency11 was not the constituency of the Nixon Administration, 
whose policies toward South Africa paralleled 11 Southern strategy" at 
home. Oudes believes that President Ford was more responsive to the 
Black constituency, and that his reversal of long-standing support for 
the Byrd Amendment was based upon a discovery that "in terms of unit 
cost it is easier to give in to pressure from Black America on a ques-
tion involving far off Africa than it is to move on a domestic 
51 Jonathan Baker, 11 0il and African Development, .. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 15 (1977), p. 188. 
52william E. Schaufele, 11 United States Economic Relations with 
Africa, .. U. S. Depa~tment of State Bulletin, Vol. 74 (March 8, 1976), 
p. 296. 
53 George W. Shepherd, .. Comment 11 , Frederick S. Arkhurst, ed. , U. S. 
Policy Toward Africa (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 52.--
54Ibid., p. 53. 
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issue ... 55 On the soer.ific issue of the Angola situation, however, the 
11 constituency 11 had no clear position, and it is doubtful that African 
policy was sufficiently salient to enough voters to make a significant 
difference in national elections. 
More significant politically was the emergence of a larger body 
of citizens who were increasingly skeptical of overseas military in-
volvements in developing countries, as a result of the bitter experi-
ence of the war in Indo-China. 
The focus of interest for these groups is the hard-pressed 
. consumer and taxpayer who suspects the multinational corpora-
tions, yawns over the oddly anti-communist shibboleths, 
prefers a less costly based at home, and hopes the United 
Nations can fulfill the original ideals of the Charter of 
Human Rights.56 
Congressional awareness of this constituency helps to explain the 
negative reaction of Congress to the urgent pleas for greater United 
States involvement in Angola to counter Soviet and Cuban involvement. 
Capabilities 
The capabilities of the United States for influencing Nigeria 
were probably lower than at any time in Nigeria•s history as a sovereign 
state. United States coercive resources during the period of the Ni-
gerian Civil War, continued until January 28, 1973. Although the number 
of infantrymen in Vietnam declined from a peak of 549,o00 in 1969 until 
the withdrawal of the final battalion in August, 1972, the participa-
55oudes, .. New Agenda for Africa Po 1 icy,.. p. 54. 
56shepherd, 11 Comment, 11 p. 53. 
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tion of some 32,000 infantry in the Cambodian expedition of April-July, 
1970, and the resumption of concerted bombing of North Vietnam in 1972 
placed a heavy, burden upon United States' military capabilities. 
After the War, the psychological and legal constraints upon over-
seas commitments remained. The War Powers Act of 1973, which imposed 
a time limit of ninety days upon the President's authority to deploy 
United States troops without express Congressional consents, was only 
a manifestation of a pervasive national mood of "non-interventionism" 
in international relations which set severe limits upon the ability of 
th E t . t . . . t t. 1 1 . t. 57 D · e xecu 1ve o use coerc1on 1n 1n erna 1ona po 1 1cs. ur1ng 
1973-74, Presidential power resources were further drained by the 
Watergate scandal, which reduced the percentage of the United States 
public who approved of "the way Nixon is handling his job as Presi-
d t .. 58 en . 
Inasmuch as the United States was probably more dependent upon 
Nigeria than vice versa after the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74, the 
Nixon and Ford Administrations had little or no economic leverage to 
exert upon the government in Lagos. 
Washington still had some resources at its disposal, especially 
technology and food, which could be converted into either utilitarian 
or coercive power. In 1971, the Federal Military Government established 
57walter Laqueur, "The West in Retreat," Commentary, Vol. 60 
(August, 1975), p. 51; Bruce Russett, "America 1s Retreat from World 
Power," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90 (Spring, 1975), p. 18. 
58 Gallup Poll, January, 1974, in Irish and Frank, pp. 104-105. 
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a Petroleum Training Institute, in an attempt to produce_the trained 
indigenous manpower necessary for true control of its economy with 
enrollments of 240 for each two year program, however, Nigeria was 
still dependent upon imported technology for oil development. 59 During 
1973, Nigeria imported over $~07 million worth of grain as a result 
of a devastating drought and the de-emphasis of domestic' food produc-
tion in the national development plan. The Third National Plan, begun 
in 1975, concedes that the country•s food supply 11 in general is inade-
quate in terms of both quantity and quality ... 60 In December, 1974, 
the World Bank, of which the United States is the most influential 
member, agreed to provide $107.5 million for five projects in agricul-
tural and livestock development in Nigeria, and provided another $20 
million loan to rehabilitate the cocoa industry. 61 United States• 
grain supplies accounted for nearly half of the total world supply. 62 
Not until 1975 did the United States• government move 11Slowly, 
even awkwardly to wield food power in the diplomatic area 11 by placing 
.. quid pro quo conditions .. upon delivery of commercial grain exports. 63 
The deliberate use of United States agripower as an instrument of for-
eign policy was used primarily in bargaining with the Soviet Union. 
Drimestic and world opinion, as well as the political influence of 
59Jonathan Baker, 11 0il and African Development, .. p. 188. 
60The Third National Plan, quoted in 11 Nigeria, 11 Africa Comtem-
porary Record 1975-76, p. 803. 
6111 Nigeria, 11 Africa Contemporary Record 1974-75, p. 8 751. 
62 nu. S. Food Power: Ultimate Weapon in World Politics? 11 Business 
Week (December 15, 1975), p. 54. 
63 Ibid. 
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several million farmers, would severely limit the use of food as a wea-
pon against such hungry nations as Nigeria. 
' Watergate, as well as the Indo-China War, exacted a heavy toll 
upon the prestige and other identitive resources of the United States. 
During the Watergate crisis, the limited responsive capabilities of 
the United States President resulted in treatment of the Nigerian 
S C d h . h . d . N . . . 1 t 64 Th upreme amman er w 1 c was percelVe 1 n 1 ger1 a as an 1 nsu . e 
United States' Government had scheduled a meeting between President 
Nixon and General Gowan on October 5, 1973, but in September the 
appointment was cancelled. It was later disclosed that Nixon, "pre-
occupied with the firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor Cox and the 
resignation of the Attorney General, wanted to make the first weekend 
in October a long one at Key Biscayne."65 In sum, during a period 
which, according to Russett, was characterized by "The Americans' 
Retreat from World Power," 66 the United States Executive was substan-
tially deprived of effective means of influencing or responding to a 
major oil-producing nation~ 
Characteristics of Nigeria 
The United States' "retreat" from international involvement coin-
cided with the emergence of Nigeria as one of the most powerful and 
64Herskovits, "Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power," p. 17; 
"Wooing of Nigeria: A Courtship Pays Off," U. S. News and World 
Report, Vol. 83 (December, 1977), p. 70. 
65Bruce Oudes, "The United States' Year in Africa," Africa Contem-
porary Record, 1973-74, pp. 51-52. 
66Russett, p. 1. 
active states in African international politics. As a result of its 
civil war, Nigeria acquired one of the largest armies on the African 
continent--a force of 250,000--which the Federal Military Government 
continued to maintain. In terms of Gross National Product, which 
Organski considers to be the best single indicator of a country's 
power potential, 67 Nigeria's G.N.P. of approximately $4.8 billion was 
surpassed, in sub-Saharan Africa, only by that of South Africa. 68 
Nigeria was not only developing the capabilities for influence, 
but also was evolving 11 a more activist and militant foreign policy 
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than it did under any of the previous civilian governments of the first 
or second Republics ... 69 Herskovits attributed the F.M.G.'s $3 million 
interest-free loan to neighboring Dahomey, and construction of road 
links to Niger, to a policy of undermining 11 the most obvious of Afri-
ca's neo-colonialisms--that of France ... 70 Of particular importance, 
from the standpoint of relations between the United States and Nigeria, 
was the fact that after 1970 Nigeria 11 emerged as a militant champion of 
African liberation movements ... 7l At a Summit Meeting of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU) in 1971, General Gowon proposed that Africa 
11 liberate at least one colonial territory within the next three years 11 
67A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd edition (New York: Al-
fred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 208. 
68Leslie Rubin and Brian Weinstein, Introduction to African Poli-
tics: A Continental Approach (New York: Praeger, 1974), Table, p. 299. 
6911 Nigeria, 11 Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, p. B 738. 
70Herskovits, 11 Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power, 11 p. 16. 
7111 Nigeria, .. Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72, p. B 657. 
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and called for "direct confrontation" with- South Africa.72 At the 
OAU's Foreign Ministers• meeting in the same year; the Nigerian repre-
sentative successfully led a group of 28 members in successfully oppos-
ing the proposal backed by 11 members that the OAU begin a "dialogue" 
with South Africa. The Nigerian Minister for External Affairs prom~sed 
that his country would "oppose to the last drop of its blood any sug-
gestion that the OAU as an organization which speaks on behalf of all 
independent Africa should enter into a dialogue with South Africa." 73 
These new manifestations of militancy on the part of Nigeria toward the 
white governments of sub-Saharan Africa occurred during the same year 
the United States was beginning to pursue friendlier policies toward 
those governments, pursuant to the rationale of Option Two, NSSM-39. 
Nigeria recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau in September, 
I 
1973, when Portugal still claimed sovereignty over that territory. In 
contrast, the United States delayed recognition until 1976, and was 
the only country to veto the admission of Guinea-Bissau to the World 
Health Organization in 1974. Even Portugal abstained. 
·It was the clash between Nigerian and United States policies to• 
ward Angola which produced the greatest strain in relations between 
Lagos and Washington. In 1975, the F.M.G. not only recognized the 
MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, but also provided $20 mil-
lion in aid to that party and promised to send Nigerian troops to sup-
port the MPLA, if the latter requested them. Thus, the efforts of 
72Quoted in Ibid., p. B 658. 
73Quoted in Colin Legum, "Dialogue: The Great Debate," Africa 
Contemporary Record, 1971-72, p. A 77. 
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the Ford Administration to aid the opposing FNLA/UNITA coalition 
aroused animosity in Lagos. 
Differing policies toward southern Africa were not the only sources 
of discord between the United States and Nigeria. Following the 
Nigerian Civil War, the F.M.G. embarked upon a course of economic 
nationalism which resulted in 55 perc.ent government share in the equity 
of all oil companies in 1974. In 1975, Nigeria joined the "hawksi' of 
O.P.E.C. in demanding a 20 percent increase in the price of petroleum. 
Whether or not the reaction of Nigeria to South African interven-
tion in Angola, or to President Ford's letter of January, 1976, would 
have been the same had General Gowon remained in office is a matter 
of speculation. The coup d'etat which overthrew Gowon in July, 1975, 
brought to power more a Supreme Commander who showed a greater willing-
ness than Gowon to take drastic measures against corruption and inef-
ficiency in domestic .Policy. 74 It is clear that this "iron surgeon" 75 
was no less determined than the Gowon government to combat white rule 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and to assert national control over Nigeria•s 
economic resources. 
74Africa Report, Vol. 21 (January-February, 1976), p. 23. 
75The label "iron surgeon" is borrowed from Edward Feit, "The 
Rule of the Iron Surgeons: Military Government in Spain and Ghana," 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 1 (July, 1969), pp. 485-86. 
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CHAPTER V 
RESTORATION OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS: 
APRIL, 1976 TO SEPTEMBER, 1978 
·The exchange of visits by Nigeria's Supreme Commander, Lt. General 
Obasanjo, to the United States in October, 1977, and by President Car-
ter to Nigeria in March, 1978, were manifestations of the dramatic 
improvement which had taken place in relations between their countries. 
A new cooperative relationship between the two countries 11 proved in-
strumental in the mediation of the border conflict between Zaire and 
Angola. According to F~ustel: 
U. S. diplomatic initiatives backed Nigerian mediation of the 
conflict .... During the talks a U. S. preference for the 
Zaire problem 'to be handled by the Africans themselves• 
emerged amid indications that the Nigerian government would 
use its good offices with the Neto government in Angola to 
mediate the conflict.2 
Ironically, the new partnership was made possible, partly, by actions 
taken by Secretary Kissinger on the trip in April, 1976, during which 
he was spurned by the Nigerian government. 
Kissinger's speech at Lusaka, Zamiba, on April 27, 1976, expressed 
unequivocally the United States• commitment to 11 Unrelenting opposition .. 
1Feustel, p. 49. 
2Ibid. 
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to the white government of Rhodesia 11 Until a negotiated settlement is 
achieved; 11 to independence for Namibia under a definite timetable, with 
United Nations' supervised elections in which all groups of Namibia 
could participate in deciding ''the political and constitutional struc-
ture of their country; .. and to 11 self-determihation, majority rule, 
equal right and human dignity for all the peoples of Africa."3 One of 
his promises was given substance five months later, when Kissinger 
secured an agreement from Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to transfer 
power to the black majority in his country within two years. The Carter 
administration continued and extended these positions, thereby making 
clear that the United States was now on the side of the more militant 
African nationalists against the white governments of sub-Saharan Africa. 
These fundamental transformations in United States' policy toward 
Africa followed several major changes in decision-making variables which 
might explain the re-orientation of the United States government toward 
Africa and Nigeria. 
Decision-Makers 
The willingness of Congress to deny the President's urgent requests 
for military aid to FNLA/UNITA while the Soviet Union and Cuba provided 
the MPLA with sufficient assistance for victory was a sobering experi-
ence for the Ford Administration. By March, the MPLA and supporting 
Cuban forces had triumphed, although guerrilla resistance continued in 
parts of Angola. The United States executive confronted the dual chal-
3Quoted in 11 Kissinger Speech Heralds New Era in U. S.-Africa Re-
lations, .. Africa Report, Vol. 21 (May-June, 1976), p. 21; see also 
Franklin H. Williams, 11 Towards an African Policy, .. Africa Report, Vol. 
21 (July-August, 1976), p. 2. 
lenges of regaining political initiatives not only with the Soviet 
Union, but also with the United States Congress. 
Institutions 
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Few important changes occurred in the structure or operation of 
foreign policy decision-making institutions affecting Nigeria during 
1976. One significant change was a new effort at bipartisan involve-
ment in United States-African relations--a development which Kornegay 
attributes to the politics of a presidential election year. 4 Kissinger 
was careful to include a liberal Democrat, Senator Abraham Ribicoff, 
in his entourage visiting Africa. Ribicoff•s support proved to be use-
ful in countering critics of Kissinger•s Lusaka proposals. If the 
United States did not support Kissinger•s African initiatives, the 
Senator said, 11 a shambles of the American position in the Third World, 
including Africa, would result. 115 
Profound changes in the decision-making structure occurred after 
the inauguration of President Carter in January, 1977. The highly 
centralized pattern of the Kissinger era was replaced by a more flex-
ible, collegial pattern, in which lines of responsibility are often 
difficult to discern. Indeed, State Department spokesmen stress that 
11 no one person or bureau is making policy, .. and that 11 policy is made by 
consensus. 116 According to Deutsch, 11 (t)he President himself and a 
4Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., 11 Africa and Presidential Politics, .. 
Africa Report, Vol. 21 (July-August, 1976), p. 7. 
5Quoted in Ibid. 
6Richard Deutsch, 11 Carter•s African Record, 11 Africa Report, Vol. 
23 {March-April, 1978), p. 47. 
collection of close personal appointees currently make African policy 
decisions." 7 Besides the President, the persons include: the Secre-
tary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
the Director of the Office of Pol icy Planning fn the State Department 
and his aids, the Special Assistant to the President for National 
Security Affairs, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations 
and aide, and the Vice President. 
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The most conspicuous figure in United States• relat,ions with 
Nigeria and other African countries is the Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Andrew Young. Young•s prominent role in negotiating a partner-
ship with Nigeria to mediate the Zaire crisis, and in negotiating with 
British Foreign Secretary David Owen on 11 Anglo-American 11 Plan for a 
settlement between the Rhodesian government and b 1 ack guerri 11 as, has 
involved him more deeply in African affairs than any previous incumbent 
of his office. A leading role has also been given to the Vice Presi-
dent in conducting important negotiations involving Africa. In May, 
1977 Vice President Mondale was given the responsibility for meeting 
with South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna on the subject 
of majority rule in South Africa. 8 
Another significant development has been revitalization of the 
Office of Policy Planning in the State Department--which had been 
moribund since the Truman Administration. Headed by Mr. Anthony Lake, 
and including two top African specialists, Marianne Spiegel and Haskell 
Ward, the Policy Planning Office vied with the Africa Bureau as the 
7Ibid., p. 47. 
8Quoted in 11 U. S. Warns South Africa to End Discrimination--or 
Else, 11 Africa Report, vol. 22 (July-August, 1977), p. 31. 
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most responsive to Black African viewpoints. 9 The Policy Planning Of-
; 
fice is responsible for providing long-term policy options for the 
Secretary of State, and often prepares the Secretary's speeches. In 
the Carter Administration, the State Department and the National Se-
curity Affairs Staff were, once again, headed by separate, often rival 
figures: Secretary of State Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, respectively. 
In the House of Representatives, Ad Hoc Monitoring Group on South 
Africa, a group of 30 House liverals, was organized in September, 1977, 
· to back legislation to exert economic pressure on South Africa. The 
group is independent of, but generally supportive of, the still active 
Congressional Black Caucus. 
Although these diverse centers of decision-making influence were 
not always in agreement, they shared a basic consensus supportive of 
the aspirations of Black Africans which had been lacking in the United 
States since the dissolution of Kennedy's 11 New Africa 11 group. 
Idiosyncratic Variables 
It is unlikely that the personality and attitudes of Henry Kissin-
ger underwent a basic alteration during his last few months in office. 
His Lusaka Declaration is consistent with ideas of statecraft and per-
sonality patterns which are revealed in his writings and in his actions 
as Secretary of State. Flexibility of political alignment, unencumber-
ed by ideological or moralistic attachments, was the essence of the 
classical statecraft of Metternich and Castlereagh. A good statesman, 
9 Deutsch, p. 47. 
Kissinger argued, must adapt to changes in the international environ-
ment.10 Mazlish observes that 11 a constant theme in Kissinger's life 
and career 11 was 11 his ability to change and develop ... ll Consequently, 
it is not surprising that Kissinger, who had advised friendlier rela-
tions with the white governments of Africa when it appeared that 11 The 
whites are her to stay and the only way that constructive change can 
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12 come about is through them,.. would recommend a different policy when 
events in Angola and Mozambique cast doubt upon that assumption. 
Much credit, for the change in United States• policy must also 
be given to William E. Schaufele, Jr., who became Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs in December, 1975. Schaufele had extensive exper-
ience in tropical Africa, as former Ambassador to Upper Volta, Depart-
ment Desk Officer for the Congo, Deputy Director of the Office of 
Central African Affairs. According to Schaufele: 
U. S. policies in southern Africa are essentially founded on 
political interests, a significant ingredient of which is 
concern for human rights •... We cannot remain a spectator 
in the decolonization of Rhodesia and Namibia and the system 
of apartheid in Sout~ Africa.l3 
Nevertheless Schaufele's approach was compatible with Kissinger's style 
1 OK. . 1 1ss1nger, p. . 
11 . . . Mazlish, p. 284. 
12 
.. Text of Option 2 of NSSM 39, 11 in Bruce Oudes, 11 The United 
States• Year in Africa, .. Africa Contemporary Record, 1974-75, p. A 99. 
13William E. Schaufele, Jr., 11 U. S. Relations in Southern Africa, .. 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 432 (July, 1977), p. 111. 
of statecraft in emphasizing that 110ur diplomacy toward South Africa 
must ... be carried out with a good deal of finesse and skill, .. and 
in advocating 11 a nuanced policy 11 toward that country ... 14 
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Schaufele continued to head the Africa Bureau until July, 1977, 
when he was replaced by Richard Moose. Schaufele became associated 
with the 11 gradualisC faction which eventually became a minority view-
point among the makers of United States policy toward Africa in the 
Carter Administration. Yet Schaufele provided an element of continuity 
between Kissinger's policies of the Lusaka Declaration, on the one 
hand, and the views of the uncompromising African liberationists of the 
Carter Administration, on the other. The appointment of Moose, former 
Staff Director of the Foreign Assistance Subcommittee of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee signified not only the Carter administra-
tions's awareness of Africa's economic problems, but also recognition 
of the need for closer ties between the Africa Bureau and Congress. 
The uncompromising 11 liberationist 11 position was advanced by Andrew 
Young, Assistant Secretary Lake, and Vice President Mondale. 15 Feustel 
considers Young's visit to the Festival of Arts and Culture in Nigeria 
in 1977 to be a milestone in the political relations between the two 
countries. 
Visiting with the Nigerian head of state, General Olusegun 
Obasanjo and the foreign minister, Brigadier Joseph Garba, 
Ambassador Young discussed the whole gamut of the diplomatic 
and economic spectrum, especially southern Africa. Since 
14Ibid., p. ll6. 
15Daniel Fine, "Rhodesia: A Gingerly Diplomacy," The Nation, 
Vol. 225 (September 10, 1977), p. 199; 11 U. S. Warns South Africa, 11 
p. 31. 
then Young has continued his talks with the Nigerians on south 
ern Africa--a recognition of the importance of Nigeria's lead-
ership in African politics.l6 
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Upon his return to the United States from Nigeria, Young declared that 
"Nigeria is the key to Africa ... 17 
Young's extensive tours of Africa, and his outspoken, controver-
sial statements in support of African liberation, are reminiscent of 
the style of G. Mennen Williams in Kennedy's Africa Bureau. Like 
Williams, Young had no previous diplomatic experience, but a strong 
domestic political constituency and close personal ties to the Presi-
dent. President Carter has acknowledged that "whenAndrew Young speaks 
for our country, he speaks with my full authority and my complete 
support." 18 Young's status as a Black Civil rights leader has also 
probably been an asset in establishing rapport with the leaders of 
Black Africa. Nigeria's Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier 
Garba, has called Young "a great Africanist who represents a new and 
emerging black conscience coming out of America ... 19 
Anthony Lake, the Director of the Office of Policy Planning, 
earned the reputation as a dissident member of the National Security 
Council Staff during the Nixon administration, and had been under 
electronic surveillance by his superiors. Before his appointment by 
President Carter he wrote "The Tar Baby Option," criticising the offi-
cial policy, contained in Option Two of NSSM 39, of supporting white 
16Feustel, pp. 48-49. 
17Quoted in Africa Diary (February 4, 1977), p. 8322. 
18Presidential Documents (Friday, June 7, 1977), p. 867. 
19,,N. . 1ger1a: High Diplomacy," Africa (November, 1977), p. 20. 
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minority governments· in Africa. Although Young is a more conspicuous 
figure, Lake has been credited with greater decision-making influence._20 
Vice President Mondale has also been more active and outspoken 
than his counterparts in previous administrations on matters involving 
Africa. At a news conference in Vienna, where he was meeting with Prime 
Minister Vorster, Mondale warned: "We hope that the South African 
Prime Minister will not rely on any illusions that the United States 
will in the end intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is 
pursuing. Failure to make progress will lead to a tragedy of human 
history." 21 On the subject of the quasi-independent tribal homelands 
inside South Africa, Mondale said: 11 We cannot accept, let alone de-
fend, governments that reject the basic principles of human rights, 
economic opportunity, and the political participation of all of their 
people, regardless of race. 1122 
Secretary of State Vance has taken a far less domineering attitude 
to the State Department than Kissinger. Unlike Kissinger, he had not 
developed an elaborate theory of international politics, but had served 
as a 11 diplomatic troubleshooter 11 for President Johnson. 23 As former 
Deputy Secretary of Defense, however, Vance had experience as a top 
adviser to both Secretary of Defense McNamara and President Johnson, 
and he has been credited with an influential role in persuading Presi-
2°Fine, p. 199. 
21 Quoted in 11 Mondale vs. Vorster: Tough Talk, 11 Time, Vol. 109 
(May 30, 1977), p. 34. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hoopes, p. 214. 
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dent Johnson to reconsider the wisdom of continued escallation in Viet-
24 . 
nam. Vance has shown greater sensitivity than Kissinger to the do-
mestic political and economic dimensions of foreign policy. 25 Lacking 
expertise on Africa, he has relied heavily upon the Africa Bureau and 
the Office of Policy Planning in developing policies toward that con-
tinent. 
On July 1, 1977, Vance delivered, before the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, his major policy speech on 
Africa. He said, inter alia, that: 
The most effective policies toward Africa are affirmative po-
licies. They should not be reactive to what other powers do, 
nor to crises as they arise .... A negative, reactive policy 
that seeks only to oppose Soviet or Cuban involvement in 
Africa would be dangerous and futile. Our best course is to 
help resolve the problems which create opportunities for ex-
ternal intervention.26 
Vance referred specifically to Nigeria in announcing that the United 
States• approach would be 11 to build positive relations with the Africans 
primarily through support for their political independence and economic 
development through the strengthening of soc~al ties. 1127 · He said: 11 0ur 
new and positive relations with Nigeria encourages us in this course ... 28 
A somewhat different view of Africa has been expressed by Vance•s 
principal rival in the Carter Administration, National Security Adviser 
24 Ibid., p. 217. 
25 Ibid., pp. 215-216; Mazlish, pp. 169 and 258. 
26cyrus Vance, 11 U. S. Policy Toward Africa: To Assist Human Needs 
and Rights, .. Vital Speeches (August 15, 1977), pp. 642-643. 
27 Ibid., p. 645. 
28 Ibid. 
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Brzezinski. Brzezinski attaches far more importance to the Third World 
than did'Kissinger. 29 Brzezinski considers Nigeria to be .. a most im- \ 
portant 11 African country. 30 While accompanying President Carter to 
Nigeria, Brzezinski stated that a 11 profound change .. has occurred in 
America•s attitude toward Africa ... 31 Unlike other Carter Administra-
tion officials, however, especially Lake and Young, Brzezinski continues 
to stress Cold War rivalry, and the need to contain Soviet advances 
in Africa, either by direct action or through proxies such as Morocco, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Iran. 32 
The final arbiter among these advisers is President Carter, him-
self. Lacking previous forei.gn policy expertise, and new to the circles 
of power in Washington, Carter must rely more heavily upon the advice 
of others than did Kennedy. He appears to rely more heavily upon the 
advice of Young, Vance and Lake on African matters than upon that of 
other advisers. 33 
While welcoming Nigeria•s Supreme Commander, General Obasanjo, to 
the United States, Carter remarked that: 11 Nigeria is the most important 
country economically in Africa ... 34 During Carter•s own visit to Nigeria 
29oona1d Baker, 11 Kissinger--Carter: U. S. Perspective on Southern 
Africa, Developments, .. African Institute Bulletin No. 68 (1977), p. 200. 
3011 Nigeria and the United States, .. West Africa (October 10, 1977), 
p. 2062. 
31 
.. Carter•s Nigeria Visit, .. Christian Science Monitor (April 3, 
1978), p. 9. 
3211Africa on the Front Burner, .. The Economist, No. 266 (February 
25, 1978), p. 26. 
33F· 119 1ne, p. . 
34110basanjo in Washington, .. West Africa (October 17, 1977), p. 2138. 
in March, 1978, the President observed that: 
... it is no coincidence that I come to Nigeria to talk about 
bilateral relationships and the problems of Africa. And it 
is no coincidence that our nation has now turned in an unpre-
cedented way toward Afri.ca ..•. And this departure from past 
aloofness is not just a personal commitment of my own but I 
represent the deep feelings and the deep interest of all the 
people of my country.35 
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Carter also expressed pride that he was the first President to make an 
official visit to Nigeria. 36 This, in itself, is an indication of the 
new saliency which Nigeria now commands in the highest echelons of 
official decision-making in the United States. 
Demands 
The fact that an abrupt change in the Ford Administration's poli-
cies toward Africa occurred during a presidential election year and ''in 
a Bicentennial year of heightened and defensively expressed American 
nationalism, .. 37 is probably not coincidental. Kornegay suggests that 
one significant effect of Kissinger's African excursion may have been 
to pre-empt a challenge from the Democrate Party 11 to return Washington 
to the spirit of the early 60's, 38 the Kennedy era of foreign policy 
toward Africa. Soon after Congress defeated the Ford-Kissinger efforts 
to aid the FNLA/UNITA forces, Representative Udall, a liberal Democrat 
35 
.. Lagos, Nigeria: Remarks of the President at the Welcoming 
Ceremony, April 1, 1978, .. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
(April 10, 1978), p. 646. 
36Ibid. 
37 Kornegay, p. 7. 
38Ibid. 
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candidate issued a statement criticising previous Ford Administration 
policies in southern Africa. 39 Senator Frank Church's Campaign Commit-
tee issued a policy statement pointing out that the Senator had long 
advocated "that the U. S. should support nationalist movements in Africa 
which were trying to gain independence from European colonial powers."40 
Governor Carter declared: "The Angola situation is a result of (a) 
policy vacuum. The United States should move immediately toward using 
leverage on South Africa to encourage the independence of Namibia and 
the beginning of majority rule in Rhodesia.c" 41 At the April, 1976 Cau-
cus of Black Democrats, Senators Church and Jackson, Representative 
Udall, and Governor Carter all "indicated that they would rely far more 
Black American input in the shaping of U. S. policy towards Africa 
than has been the case in the past."42 
Another significant development which is likely to have influenced 
the change in Ford Administration policies is the change in orienta-
tion toward Africa on the part of the business community in the United 
States. The most dramatic change was the decision of Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion to support the Marxist MPLA in Angola when the United States 
government, through the CIA, was supporting the rival FNLA/UNITA forces. 
In autumn, 1975, Gulf paid $116 million in oil royalties to the MPLA 
39"Congressman Morris K. Udall African Policies," Africa Report, 
Vol. 21 (July-August, 1976), p. 11. 
40"Senator Frank Church's African Policy," Africa Report, Vol. 21 {July-August, 1976), p. 13. . 
41 "Jimmy Carter on Africa,"Africa Report, Vol. 21, {May-June, 
1976), pp. 19-20. 
42K 8 
' ornega.y, p. . 
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which had not yet established its position as the effective government 
of Angola. 43 Gulf•s payments to the MPLA were considerably greater 
than the $32 million which the CIA covertly provided to FNLA/UNITA. 44 
Gulf complied with a directive from the State Department to place in 
escrow an additional $125 million until the outcome of the war, but in 
March, 1976, Gulf received permission to deliver the royalties to the 
MPLA. Gulf resumed production in Angola in April, 1976--the month 
in which Secretary Kissinger issued his Lusaka Declaration. 
Williams notes that by mid-1976, the center of economic gravity of 
United States• commercial and investment interests below the Sahara 
had decisively 11 Shifted in favor of the black developing states as 
opposed to South Africa .• .45 Private United States investment in the 
black-ruled African countries totallled over $2.2 billion, more than 
half of which was in Nigeria. 46 United States• private investment in 
South Africa amounted to $1.5 billion, but the rate of investment there 
declined sharply because of political uncertainties. 47 Ironically, 
investment confidence was greater in Nigeria than in politically vola-
tile South Africa. United States• oil companies accounted for approxi-
mately four-fifths of United States• private investment in Nigeria and 
43The New York Times (February 1, 1976), p. 1. 
44The New York Times (September 25, 1975), p. 1. 
45williams, 11 Towards an African Policy, .. p. 6. 
46 Ibid.; 11 The Wooing of Nigeria: A Courtship Pays Off, .. U.S. News 
and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), pp. 68-69. 
4711 South Africa: Wary Investing Policy--Until Reform, .. Business 
Week (February, 1977), p. 67. 
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one-third of Nigerian oil production by late 1977. 48 · 
The elect~on of President Carter gave new power to the 11African 
constituency" in the United States,49 since the blacks, liberals, and 
clergymen who made up that 11 Constituency 11 were an important part of 
Carter's electoral constituency. President Carter is aware that not 
only about 94 per cent of black votes were cast for him in the national 
election, 50 but also that the support of urban blacks was critical in 
securing the nomination of the Democratic Party. Early in 1976, share-
holder resolutions were filed by a coalition of Protestant and Roman 
Catholic church groups against six large United States corporations 
and five major United States banks to curtail activities in South 
Africa. 51 These developments provided political support for the new 
course on which the United States government embarked in Africa in 
the spring of 1976. 
Functional Requisites 
In every dimension of the United States' functional requirements, 
Nigeria was more important to the United States by 1976 than in any 
previous period. By the end of 1977, United States' oil imports from 
. 52 Nigeria had risen to 18 per cent. On the other hand, between 1975 
48
"The Wooing of Nigeria," p. 69. 
49 See p. 82; Shepherd, "Comment", pp. 45-46. 
so .. A New Candidate Wins with an Old Coalition," Congressional 
Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 32, p. 820. 
51
"Africa in the U.S.," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (January-February, 
1976), p. 24; 11 Africa in the U. S., 11 Africa Report, Vol. 22 (March-
April, 1977), p. 27. 
52 "The Wooing of Nigeria," p. 67. 
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and 1977 United States doubled its exports to Nigeria--making Nigeria 
11 Africa•s main importer of United States equipment and services, in 
53 
excess of $700 million annually ... 
In the area of national security, Nigeria became valuable as a 
partner to the United States, which had become hesitant to intervene 
directly when crisis erupted in Africa. When Katangan rebels based 
in Angola launched an invasion of Zaire•s Shaba province in 1977, the 
United States called upon Nigeria to exercise increasing influence to 
settle the conflict. Nigeria was able to be of service because its 
early support of the MPLA gave it access to the government in Luanda, 
while its determined opposition to secession of Biafra gave it a bond 
of identity with Zaire. Feustel reports that: 
. A week of quiet diplomatic activity preceded the initiative 
· and i nvo 1 ved ta 1 ks between Ambassador Young and visiting 
Nigerian Foreign Minister Joseph Garba, in New York, and 
State Department discussions in Washington involving Assis-
tant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schau-
fele, Jr. 1 Garba, and Donald Easum, U. S. Ambassador to 
Nigeria.5LJ 
The United States manifested new restraint in allowing other coun-
tries--Nigeria in diplomatic arenas, France and Morocco in military 
theaters--to take the lead in .bringing the invasion to an end. Accord-
ing to one analyst, current United States policy toward Nigeria 
is based on the premise that Nigeria is listened to in Afri-
can councils. The United States can exert its influence : · 
obliquely without running the risk of direct involvement, 
53The Washington Post (September 13, 1977), p. 16. 
54 Feustel, p. 49. 
if it forms a close working relationship with Nigeria•s mili-
tary rulers.55 
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Even from the standpoint of promoting domestic cohesion in the 
United States, closer relations with a powerful Black country assumed 
new importance as a result of increasing awareness of Africa on the 
part of the American public. In a major speech explaining United 
States policy toward Africa, Secretary of State Vance observed that: 
Beyond these political and economic ties that bind our fu-
tures, there are the social and cultural links from which 
we have benefitted generally. Our society and culture are 
enriched by the heritage so many Americans find in Africa. 
We experience this enrichment every day--in our literature, 
our art, our music, and our social values.56 
The public reaction in the United States to the televized adaptation 
of Alex Haley•s novel, Roots, helped to sensitize large numbers of 
Americans, both back and white, to Africa and to racial injustice, 
at a time when events in southern Africa were making newspaper head-
1 . 57 1nes. 
Capabilities 
General Obasanjo drew attention to the growing utilitarian capa-
bilities of the United States when he remarked that 11 The United States 
without doubt possesses the largest stock and variety of technology 
55The New York Times (October 12, 1977), p. 8. 
56vance, 11 U. S. Policy Toward Africa, .. p. 624. · 
57Ali A. Mazrui, 11 Roots: The End of America•s Amnesia? 11 Africa 
Report, Vol. 22 (May-June, 1977), p. 6. 
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necessary to the successful mechanization of production and the resul-
tant abundance of material goods ... 58 Obasanjo•s first budget speech, 
in March, 1976, reported that, despite Nigeria•s oil boom, the country 
was encountering severe economic problems: an unexpected decline in 
oil production, a substantial balance of payments deficit, an overall 
decline of economic growth to 2.8 percent, and a serious decline in 
domestic food production. He ordered a revision of Nigeria•s Third 
National Plan (1975-78) to eliminate prestige projects and to give 
greater priority to housing, health, and agricultural development. On 
April 1, he launched .. Operation Feed the Nation, .. to encourage greater 
agricultural productivity. 59 A year later, he proclaimed 1977-78 to 
be 11 the year of agriculture and industry ... 60 
These new emphases increased Nigeria•s dependence upon United 
States• technology. In September, 1977, the F.M.G. sent 489 students 
to vocational training schools and junior colleges in the United States, 
under a program administered by the U. S. AID, and planned to send 
10,000 per year after 1979 under the same program. Although large num-
bers of students from other countries are studying in the United States, 
only the Nigerians are in the AID administered program. Most of the 
Nigerian students are enrolled in programs of agricultural technology, 
health care, and construction--pursuant to the revised goals of the 
5811 Lt. Gen. Obasanjo of Nigeria Visits the U. S., .. De,artment of 
State Bulletin, Vol. 77 (Washington D. C., November 14, 19 7), p. 694. 
Vol. 
59Levi A. Nwachuku, 11 Nigeria•s Uncertain Future, .. Current History, 
71 (November, 1976), p. 167. 
60Quoted in Africa Diary (April 30-May 6, 1977), P• 8456. 
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National Plan. 61 
Even more impressive than these utilitarian relationships have 
been the restoration and extension of identitive bonds between Nigeria 
and the United States. President Carter was basically accurate when 
he said: "Years ago we had nothing but animosity between us now we 
have nothing but friendship." 62 Since April, 1976, United States' 
policy objectives have moved closer to those of Nigeria in seeking .a 
just order in southern Africa and a modus vivendi with the newly liber-
ated Portuguese territories. The race and rhetoric of Andrew Young 
have given credibility to the change. 63 When Nigeria sponsored a World 
Conference for Action Against Apartheid, held in Lagos on August, 1977, 
the United States' participated actively, with Andrew Young as its of-
ficial representative. Young acknowledged that "Nigeria, in a,unique 
64 . 
. way, is responsible for the new sensitivity in the West." Conversely, 
the new sensitivity of the United States toward the aspirations of Ni-
geriaand other countries of tropical Africa has helped to restore the 
prestige of the United States in Africa. The fact that Nigeria will 
return to civilian government in 1979 under a constitution based upon 
61
"Education to Politics--U. S. Lends a Hand in Nigeria," U. S. 
News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), p. 70. 
62Quoted in Thomas A. Johnson, "Nigeria and the United States," 
Africa (December, 1977), p. 22~ 
63"Nigerian's U. S. Visit Tied to Carter Shift," The New York Times 
(Wednesday, October 12, 1977), p. 8; Africa Recorder (March 12-25, 1977), 
p. 4484; Feustel, p. 48. 
64
"Development Concerning Apartheid," Statement by Andrew Young, 
United States Representative to the United Nations, Department of State 
Bulletin (October 3, 1977), p. 446. 
::r 
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United States• model, rather than the British or the Soviet models, 65 
is one indicator of the identitive power which the United States still 
holds for Africa•s most populous country. 
A new United States• strategy of using coercive assets contributed 
to more effective relations with Nigeria.~nd other African countries. 
Instead of regarding every crisis in Africa in terms of East-West con-
frontation, and to assume the lonely role of policeman in Africa, the 
United States is learning to allow other countries, such as France, 
\ 
Belgium, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia to take the primary initiative con-
taining subversion--a strategy which proved effective in overcoming two 
incursions in Zaire. 66 
Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria 
The trend toward better relations between Nigeria and the United 
States followed a few months after Lt. General Obasanjo became head of 
the Nigerian government in February, 1976. The change in leadership 
helped to eliminate past personal animosities. Trained at the British 
Royal Engineers School and the Royal College of Defense Studies in · 
England, Obasanjo served as Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing 
in the Gowan administration, and as Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquar-
ters, in the administration of Murtala Muhammed. Obasanjo was per-
6511 The Draft Constitution has been described as •American style• 
with a strong executive president, a senate, a house of representa-
tives, federal and state legislatures. It allows for a plurality of 
political parties ... John Howe and Richard Synge, 11 Political Issues, 11 
Africa Guide, 1978 {Saffron Walden, Essex, England: Africa Guide 
Company, 1977), p. 243. 
66Daniel Southerland, 11 U. S. Foreign Policy Muddled? 11 Christian 
Science Monitor {December 19,11977), p. 3 
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ceived by foreign observers as "a quiet, competent individual ... ," 67 
somewhat less conciliatory than Gowan but less austere than Muhammed. 
As "a dominant member of the post-Gowon reformist crew," 68 Obasanjo 
continued his predecessor's programs to combat corruption and ineffi-
ciency in government, with striking success. His decisions to revise 
the Third National Plan, and to reduce government spending to combat 
inflation brought impressive results in 1976-77: a reduction of the 
rate of inflation by 15 percent, an increase in the economic growth 
rate to 10 percent {from 2.8 percent during the previous year), and a 
tripling of the rate of agricultural production. 69 This record helped 
to inspire the confidence of the United States in the new government. 
Spokesmen for the United States also indicated their satisfaction 
with Nigeria's political stability, despite the abortive coup of Febru-
ary, 1976, and with its skill in exercising power. William Schaufele, 
then Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, observed early in 1976 
that "the United States was pleased that Nigeria is recovering from an 
attempted coup in a fashion which demonstrates the viability of Nigerian 
institutions." 70 In August, 1977, Andrew Young remarked that: "The 
fact that Nigeria is exercising its power in a statesmanlike, wise and 
67Tunde Adeniran, "Olusegun Obasanjo: Head of the Nigerian Federal 
Military Government," Africa Report, Vol. 21 (May-June, 1976), p. 37. 
68Ibid., p. 38. 
69Africa Diary (April 30-May 6, 1977), p. 8456. 
70william E. Schaufele, 11 United States Economic Relations with 
Africa," Address, United States Department of State Bulletin (March 8, 
1976) ' p. 298. 
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restrained fashion adds to its credibility and effect. 1171 
' 
The evident progress of the F.M.G. in honoring its pledge to return 
the country to democratic civilian rule by October, 1979 has also en-
hanced its attractiveness to United States' decision-makers. According 
to Adeniran, 
General Obasanjo is a steadfast advocate of a return to civil-
ian rule. His personal conviction that t~e military should 
be back in the barracks, the fate of Gowan who did not keep 
·his promise, coupled with the tenacious and popularfeeling 
for civilian rule in the nearest future, point to Obasanjo 
keeping to the unconditional date set by his predecessor.72 
The successful election of a Constituent Assembly in August, 1977 pro-
ceeded smoothly, without incident; and six new commissioners, all 
civilians, have been appointed, as equivalents of cabinet ministers. 
Welcoming the appointment of civilian ministers, the New Nigerian com-
mented: 11 lt has always been our view that one of the ways of prepar-
i ng the ground for a smooth return to civilian rule is to appoint 
civilian commissioners at the federal level, while the military and the 
police are gradually phased out of the cabinet." 73 
Graubard remarks that Secretary of State Kissinger thought of 
power as 11 a complex compound, consisting, of course, of military capa-
bility and economic resources, but depending ultimately on one other 
71 Andrew Young, 11 Development Concerning Apartheid, .. Statement, 
United States Department of State Bulletin (October 3, 1977), p. 446. 
72A d . 39 n em ran, p. . 
73Quoted in Howe and Synge, p. 247. 
crucial element--the quality of political leadership." 74 By April, 
1976, it appeared that Nigeria had added that crucial element to her 
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economic and military endowments to make her a power to be reckoned 
with on the African continent. To the increasingly civil rights-con-
scious Carter Administration, the Nigerian government was also showing 
signs of progress in acquiring the institutions which Western observers 
regard as indicators of constitutionalism and democracy. 
74 Stephen R. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind (New York: 
Norton, 1973), p. 12. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
{ 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is possible to draw 
some tentative conclusions about United States foreign policy decision 
making, which might serve as hypotheses in future studies of the United 
States• relations with African countries. It is also possible to evalu-
ate the analytical utility of the paradigm which was used in this study. 
Institutions: Structure and Consens·us 
The periods of friendly relations between the United States and 
Nigeria have largely coincided with structural pluralism and ideologi-
cal consensus among decision-making units. During the post-Dulles 
11 era of good feeling .. from 1960 to 1967, the Bureau of African Affairs 
acquired substantial influence in making policy toward Africa. The 
Bureau developed an institutional identity with its principal clientele, 
the Black-ruled countries of Africa. Other decision-making agencies, 
including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, 
the National Security Affairs Staff, the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, while differing on 
some matters, shared a common set of beliefs and values which might be 
called the .. Libera 1 Co 1 d War.. ethos. Although they rejected the anti-
neutralism of Dulles, the 11 Cold War Liberals 11 accepted United States• 
responsibility to compete with the Soviet Union for the friendship of 
ll3 
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"non-aligned" developing countries. United States-Nigerian relations 
were friendliest when an informal, .inter-agency group, the so-called 
11 New Africa Group," was most influential in decision-making circles. 
The disintegration of the "New Africa Group" roughly coincided 
with the deterioration of relations between the United States and Ni-
geria. The war in Vietnam shattered the consensus which had held the 
key decision-making institutions, especially the executive branch and 
Congress, together. Consequently, the United States adopted a noncom-
mital policy toward Nigeria during the Civil War, while the diverging 
positions of the African Bureau, the Secretary of State, and the "Bia-
fra Lobby" in Congress alienated both belligerants in the war. 
The renewed prominence of the Secretary of State among the 
principal decision-makers of the Johnson Administration further re-
duced the relative influence and autonomy of the Bureau of African 
Affairs. The trend toward centralization of foreign-policy decision-
making reached its apex when the positions of National Security Af-
fairs Adviser and Secretary of State were united under Kissinger. 
Centralization of decision--making power reduced the influence of 
the Africa-oriented agencies, especially the Bureau of African Affairs. 
Unless the principal decision-maker happens to have a personal inter-
est in Africa, which, given traditional United States• interests, seems 
unlikely, the risk of a foreign policy which is unresponsive to Black 
African countries is increased. The open animosity between Kissinger 
and his African Bureau is a cas~ in point. Concentration of decision-
making responsibility did facilitate the abrupt shift in African policy 
which was manifested in Kissinger•s 1976 Lusaka Declaration. Neverthe-
less, the delay in the United States• response to. negative feedback 
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concerning its policies toward Africa illustrates the dangers of such 
concentration of decision-making influence. The return to a more 
polycentric pattern of decision-making by the Carter Administration 
enabled those officials who are most interested in Africa--notably 
the Ambassador to the United Nations, the Director of Policy Planning 
in the State Department, and the Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs--to exert major influence over foreign policy toward 
Africa. 
Idiosyncratic Variables 
Idiosyncratic characteristics of the decision-makers appear to 
have influenced United States-Nigerian relations at virtually every 
critical juncture. The personality of the President has been crucial 
in determining which other decision-making roles have been decisive. 
President Eisenhower•s choice of Herter as Dulles• successor in the 
State Department, and Herter•s inclination to delegate initiative to 
the regional Bureaus, rather than appropriate it to himself, gave the 
Bureau of African Affairs a leading role in shaping initial United 
States relations with Nigeria, at the time of the latter country•s 
independence. Friendly relations between the two countries reached 
their apex when the President himself, John F. Kennedy, had a special 
expertise and interest in the Continent, as former Chairman of the 
Senate Subcommittee on Africa, was President, and relied heavily upon 
the 11 New Africa .. Group in making key decisions affecting Nigeria. 
President Johnson•s penchant for continuity especially in foreign 
policy, resulted in the retention of many members of Kennedy•s advi-
sers on African Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, for a few years after 
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Kennedy 1 s death. The departure of Williams from the African Bureau 
I 
deprived Africa of one of its most influential champtions, and coin-
cided with the beginning of a decline in United States-Nigerian friend-
ship. 
It appears that the domestic political ties of the top advisers 
/ 
on Africa, and their enthusiasm for th~ continent, have been more 
important than their diplomatic or area-related expertise. 11 Soapy 11 
Williams and Andrew Young horrified professional diplomats, but were 
more effective at winning the simultaneous trust of Nigerian leaders 
and the President of the United States than such professional diplomats 
as Satterthwaite, Newsom, Schaufele, Palmer, and Davis. The latter 
two won the respect of Africans at the expense of that of their own 
superiors. 
Troubled relations between the United States and Nigeria have 
occurred under Secretaries of State who espoused elaborate theories 
of world power which minimized the importance of Black Africa or 
regarded it as primarily a battleground in the Cold War. Secretary of 
State Dulles 1 rejection of the legitimacy of non-alignment and accep-
tance of Portugal, imperial Belgium, and South Africa as friends be-
cause of their anti-Communism exemplified such a pattern before the 
period with which this study is concerned. Secretary of State Rusk 
regarded Nigeria as being essentially within the British sphere of 
influence, while Indo-China was the primary responsibility of the 
United States. Kissinger 1 s 11 neo-classical 11 view of Africa tended to 
regard Nigeria and other African countries as arenas of power poli-
tics among the major world powers, rather than as important indepen-
dent actors. Although the theoretical elegance of Kissinger 1 s writings 
has yet to be rivalled by that of the major architects of the Carter 
Administration's policies toward Africa, Kissing~r's successors seem 
to have greater respect for Nigeria and other African countries as 
worthy of consideration as international actors, themselves. 
Demands 
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Without negating the possibility of covert activities by a power 
elite in the decision-making process, the available evidence supports 
the proposition that a variety of interest groups were influential in 
shaping United States' relations with Nigeria. The pattern which 
emerges is one of plural elitism, in which some elites appear to wield 
more influence than others. The petroleum companies, especially Gulf 
Oil Corporation, have been active, but not always successful, in lobby-
ing for changes in United States' policy toward Nigeria and other Afri-
can countries. During the Nigerian Civil War, Gulf and Mobil lobbied 
for a more active pro-federal policy than the United States' govern-
ment did, in fact, pursue. After the Civil War, heavy involvement by 
Gulf in Angola induced that company to support pro-Portuguese colonial 
policies which contributed to the strains in relations between the 
United States and.Nigeria. Nevertheless, the pragmatism of the cor-
poration induced it to switch its support to the MPLA in 1975, when 
the Nixon Administration was supporting the opposition to that Marxist 
party. The notion that international oil interests control United 
States policy is contradicted by the behavior of Gulf, and by the fact 
that the bulk of United States' petroleum investment in tropical Africa 
was in Nigeria, where official United States policies opposing the 
"liberation" of southern Africa before 1976 were extremely unpopular. 
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The orientation of United States overseas business interests to-
ward Africa was, by no means, monolithic. Although the major automobile 
companies had heavy investment in the white-ruled countries of southern 
Africa, and companies such as Union Carbide, lobbied heavily for trade 
with Rhodesia, the oil companies, which accounted for half of all 
United States investment in Africa, had their extractive operations 
exclusively in countries belonging to the Organization of African 
Unity--especially after the independence of Angola. 
The split in international business interests has enabled non-
economic interest groups to play a decisive role in the policy-making 
process toward Nigeria. Christian missionaries, heavily concentrated 
in Nigeria, formed a loose pro-African political coalition with Black 
Americans, to whem Nigeria has a special significicance as an ancestral 
homeland and the leading economic and military power of tropical Africa. 
Functional Requisites 
Since 1960, national security interests have been at least as 
important as economics in shaping United States• policy toward Nigeria. 
During the early 196o•s, the support of Nigeria•s civilian government 
was crucial in countening the influence of the revolutionary 11 Casablan-
ca'' bloc on the continent and in supporting United States efforts to 
stabilize Congo-Kimshasa. With Nigerian help, the United States was 
so successf~l in containing Soviet influence that other regions, espe-
cially Indochina, eclipsed Africa as objects of United States' concern. 
The result was a lack of responsiveness to Nigerian concerns and sensi-
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bilities. 
The destabilization of Africa by events following the Portuguese 
and Ethiopian coups revived United States' interest in Africa, but the 
United States had to adjust to a new power structure on the African 
Continent. The American reflex of containment clashed with the inter-
ests of a Nigeria more powerful and militant than before. By abandon-
ing an initia·l effort to be policeman for Africa and accepting Nigeria 
as a more equal partner, the United States was, once again, able to 
form a successful partnership with Nigeria which served mutual nation-
al security interests managing conflict between Zaire and Angola. 
The relationship between Africa and domestic politics in the 
United States remains minimal, but the potential for Africa to become 
a major domestic issue is more apparent now than in the 1960's. Blacks 
comprise over 11 percent of the population of the United States, and 
a significant number of white liberals might reasonably be expected to 
share Black antipathy toward the white-dominated regimes of southern 
Africa. Consequently United States' involvement in supplying military 
aid to South Africa or Rhodesia has the potential of producing divi-
sions in the United States which would be at least as profound as 
those during the Vietnam War. The good services of African partners 
like Nigeria in assisting in the challenging diplomacy ahead will be 
more important to the domestic harmony of the United States than in 
the past. 
Capabilities 
The findings of the present study support the view of Deutsch 
' that responsive capabilities are among the most critical in affecting 
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the quality of relations among states. 1 . Responsive capabilities are a 
complex compound consisting of both emotional and--..[!!aterial character-
istics. At times when the United States material assets which were 
vastly superior to those of Nigeria, emotional variables impeded full 
utilization of these assets in responding to Nigeria's needs. The 
force of tradition relegating tropical Africa to an inferior position 
vis-a-vis Europe, Asia and Latin America as a sphere of United States' 
concern; the retreat from foreign aid responsibilities in regions which 
have not replicated the 11 economic miracle 11 of the Marshall Plan in 
. Europe; the massive commitment of military and economic resources to 
the Vietnam theater, and the reluctance for subsequent foreign involv-
. ments elsewhere which resulted from that ill-fated venture; and preoc-
cupation with domestic crises, such as Watergate, have all limited 
United States• responsiveness to Nigeria•s needs in past admfnistra-
tions. 
Yet the utilitarian interdependence between the two countries 
created by Nigeria•s petroleum resources and the United States• petro-
leum technology provides the material basis for mutual responsiveness 
based on reciprocal economic benefits. Moreov~r, a significant change 
in the identitive capabilities of the United States, personified in 
Andrew Young and given substance in the United States• 11 hard line 11 on 
Rhodesian settlement, has given credibility to the Carter Administra-
tion•s assurances that Nigeria and the United States are once again on 
the same side in international politics. In the present study, classi-
1Karl W. Deutsch, 11 Communication Theory and Political Integration, .. 
Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds., The Integration of Politi-
ca 1 Colll11uni ties (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co. , 1964), p. 70. 
121 
fication of power resources into the tripartite categories of coercive, 
utilitarian and identitive catego,ries has facilitated analysis of the 
interplay of qualitatively different resources in support of fbreign 
policy decisions. The effectiveness of the Kennedy and Carter Admin-
istrations in dealings with Nigeria underscores the importance of the 
least tangible of the three categories: identitive resources. 
Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria 
Changes in the characteristics of Nigeria, as perceived by United 
States• officials have, likewise, influenced the decision-outputs of 
the United States. Political stability, a pro-western political orien-
tation, economic policies favorable to overseas political investors, 
influence in international arenas, and democratic political institutions 
appear to be the perceived characteristics which have been most salient 
to decision-makers in the United States. The civilian regime which 
governed Nigeria from 1960 to 1966 was perceived by United·states of-
ficials to have relatively high levels of achievement in all five areas, 
despite the considerable gap between image and reality where the first 
and last of the characteristics is concerned. The deflation of Ni-
gerta•s reputation for stability and democracy as a result of the mili-
tary coups d•etat and the civil war in 1967, combined with disenchant-
ment over the Federal Military Government•s efforts to 11 Nigerianize 11 
the economy, coincided with the deterioration of relations between Wash-
ington and Lagos. General Murtala Muhammed•s support of the MPLA in 
Angola was interpreted by Dr. Kissinger as ,.pro-Soviet, .. even though 
Gulf Oil Company•s support of the MPLA was given a different interpre-
tation. Consequently, it is not surprising that relations between the 
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United States and Nigeria were at their lowest ebb during the adminis-
tration of General Muhammed, whose nationalist economic and foreign 
policies were misconstrued by Washington as pro-Socialist. 
Improved relations between the two capitals followed changes in 
both realities and perceptions of Nigeria by Washington•s decision-· 
makers. Successful steps toward restoration of civilian government in 
Nigeria; the country•s growing economic and military power, coupled 
with its activism in international politics; the stabilization of 
domestic affairs by the reforms of the late General Muhammed; and 
Nigeria•s willingness to co-operate with the United States in alleviat-
ing tensions between Zaire and Angola, are realities. The Carter Ad..; 
ministration•s interpretation of Nigerian economic and foreign policies 
as manifestations of nationalism rather than pro-Soviet socialism re-
flect significant perceptual changes since the Nixon and Ford Adminis-
trations. 
The Decision-Making Paradigm: 
Strengths and Limitations 
The decision-making paradigm which was used in this study has 
both strengths and limitations as an analytical tool. By forcing at-
tention to the interaction of a multiplicity of variables, the paradigm 
helped to identify several plausible explanations, or partial explana-
tions of changes in United States-Nigerian relations. The foregoing 
analysis thereby suggests alternatives to simple mono-causal explana-
tions of international politics, such as the economic determinism of 
the Marxists or ~he power determinism. of the Realists. 
A limitation of the paradigm is that it provides little guidance 
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to the assignment of relative weights to the variables, nor does it 
establish 11 causal 11 connections among them. It is submitted that the 
weighting of variables and causal modeling are premature, given the 
current state of research in international relations. It is hoped that 
further use of the paradigm in case studies and comparative research 
will provide the basis for more penetrating theories of international 
relations. 
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